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I. INTRODUCTION

"I have a dream," Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., declared from
the steps of the Lincoln Memorial during the March on Washington in
1963.1 About 200,000 people had gathered to listen to Dr. King's
famous speech and to participate in the events of the day. 2 Millions
more witnessed the live broadcast on major television and radio
stations. 3 Others read the text of the speech in newspapers across the
4
country.
Just over a month later, Dr. King applied for federal copyright
protection for the speech. 5 Under federal copyright law at the time, an
owner who published a work prior to complying with statutory
formalities lost his ownership rights. 6 Thus, the question arose: did
Dr. King's delivery of the speech coupled with its extensive
reproduction and dissemination constitute a publication of the speech,
7
thereby forfeiting his ownership rights?
Although the speech was delivered over forty years ago,
litigation concerning the existence of this copyright has persisted into
the twenty-first century.8
Others continue to litigate their own
copyright disputes regarding musical compositions and other works

1.
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir.
1999).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.; Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1348 (N.D.
Ga. 1998), rev'd, 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999).
4.
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1213; King v. Mister Maestro, Inc.,
224 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
5.
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1349; Estate of Martin Luther
King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1213.
6.
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1214.
7.
Id.
8.
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga.
2002).
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created decades ago. 9 The problem stems from an almost onehundred-year-old statute with a glaring gap.
The statute, the
Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act"), which governs disputes of whether
a work was published before 1978, fails to provide the definition of its
key term-"publication."'10 Accordingly, for nearly a century, courts
and scholars have disputed the definition of publication under the
1909 Act and the application of that definition to cases."
Discrepancies exist not only between jurisdictions, but also within
them, as manifested by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Estate of
Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., in which each member of
the three-judge panel disagreed either on the appropriate definition of
12
publication or on its application to the facts of the case.
This Note proposes a new definition that is simple, complete,
and consistent with the 1909 Act as written and with the Act's dual
purposes of promoting the free dissemination of ideas through a
reward of a limited monopoly to authors.
Part II presents a
background of the 1909 Act by examining its continued relevance, its
dual policies, some of its methods for implementing those policies, and
the significance of publication to the 1909 Act. Part III analyzes
leading definitions of publication, areas of consensus and
disagreement in their application, and exploitations of works not
generally considered publication. Part IV offers a new definition of
publication under the 1909 Act: subject to three exceptions,1 3
publication is the exploitation of a work authorized by the author
and/or owner of the work. Part V applies this definition to the facts of
several notable cases and demonstrates how it serves the purposes of
the 1909 Act.

9.

See infra notes 15-17.

10. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
[hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].

NIMMER ON

COPYRIGHT

§ 4.04 (2004)

11. See id. § 4.01 (discussing the significance of publication); see also Part III.A.
12. See infra notes 122-138 and accompanying text. The majority and the concurring judge
disagreed on the proper definition of publication. Compare Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Inc., 194 F.3d at 1215, with id. at 1221 (Cook, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The
dissent implicitly agreed with the concurrence's definition by endorsing the lower court's
adoption of the same definition but, ultimately, disagreed with the concurrence's application of
that definition. Id. at 1227 (Roney, J., dissenting); id. at 1221 (Cook, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
13. The three exceptions (limited publication, performance, and distribution of a
phonorecord embodying a musical composition) are discussed infra Part III.B.
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II. BACKGROUND: THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1909 & PUBLICATION

A. The 1909 Act: Still Relevant After All These Years
Today, courts must look back almost a century to the 1909 Act
to resolve certain copyright disputes involving some of the most
influential people, artists, and works in U.S. history. For example, in
the last six years, the 1909 Act has governed litigation involving Dr.
King's "I Have a Dream" speech,' 4 two Rolling Stones songs, 15 several
songs by country music legend George Jones, 16 and various works by
renowned graphic artist M.C. Escher. 17 These cases arise when
parties dispute whether a work acquired statutory copyright
protection prior to January 1, 1978, the effective date of the current
Copyright Act of 1976 ("the 1976 Act").18 In these cases, the stakes are
high because, if the work received copyright protection, the author
and/or owner is entitled to the potentially large financial and other
benefits of the copyright.19 However, if the work failed to acquire such
protection, the author and/or owner forfeits his copyright to the work
and, consequentially, any benefits from owning the copyright.

14. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1214; Estate of Martin Luther King,
Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2002)..
15. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Lavere, 217 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000); see also infra text
accompanying notes 278-287.
16. King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003); see also infra
text accompanying notes 288-308.
17. Cordon Holding B.V. v. Northwest Publ'g Corp., 98 Civ. 4797, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6111, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2002). Other recently litigated works involving publication and
the 1909 Act include dances and photographs. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v.
Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 644-45 (2d Cir. 2004)
(dances); Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. BPI Communications, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1189,
1197-99 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (photographs of Marilyn Monroe).
18. See Brown v. Tabb, 714 F.2d 1088, 1090 (11th Cir. 1983) ("(T]he determination of
whether a work entered the public domain prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act must be
made according to the copyright law as it existed before that date."); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 10, § 4.01[B] ("The act of publication may have resulted in a work being injected into
the public domain under the law as it existed prior to January 1, 1978."). Congress substantially
revised U.S. copyright law in enacting the 1976 Act. The 1976 Act governs disputes concerning
whether a work obtained statutory copyright protection on or after January 1, 1978 and affords
the concept of publication less importance than the 1909 Act does. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 10, § 4.01.
19. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.01[B]. The consequences of nonobservance of
statutory formalities are less severe under the 1976 Act than under the 1909 Act. Id. at 7.01[A].
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B. Dual Policies of the 1909 Act
The dual policies of the 1909 Act are the free dissemination of
ideas and the reward of a limited monopoly to authors. 20
The
legislative history of the 1909 Act demonstrates Congress's effort to
further these dual purposes:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution
is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings ... but upon the
ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful
arts will be promoted
by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to
21
their writings.

Additionally, according to the House Judiciary Committee, the
1909 Act was intended primarily to benefit the public, not authors:
Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public,
such rights are given ....

In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ...

two

questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the
public; and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?
The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a
22
benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.

These dual purposes are rooted in the Patents and Copyright
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries. '23 The U.S. Supreme Court has
concluded that authors' monopoly privileges are limited and are not
the primary purpose of the Clause. 24 Instead, the limited monopoly
"makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration." 25 Thus,
"[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
' 26
public from the labors of authors.
20. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (The
limited monopoly grant "is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by
the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired."); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra
note 10, §1.05[D] (The "limited times" provision strikes "a balance between two competing
interests: the interest of authors in the fruits of their labor on the one hand, and on the other,
the interest of the public in ultimately claiming free access to the materials essential to the
development of society.").
21. H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 7 (1909).
22. Id.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8., cl. 8.
24. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429 ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may
authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.").
25. Id.
26. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932), quoted in Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S.
at 429 and in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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C. Implementing the Dual Policies
The 1909 Act promotes its dual policies of the free
dissemination of ideas and the incentive of a limited monopoly to
authors in several ways, including through the concepts of limited
monopoly, the public domain, and fair use.
1. Limited Monopoly & the Public Domain
The 1909 Act implements its dual policies in part by
establishing a limited monopoly in the work of authorship for the
copyright owner. 27 Upon securing a copyright in a work, the copyright
owner obtains several exclusive rights including the right to print,
reprint, publish, copy, vend, and perform. 28 As initially enacted, the
1909 Act secured a limited monopoly for twenty-eight years plus a
renewal term of twenty-eight years. 29 Since then, Congress repeatedly
has extended the duration of the copyright term. 30 However, Congress
31
may not create a perpetual copyright.
The 1909 Act provides for a work to enter the public domain if
copyright protection is never achieved or after the limited monopoly
expires. 32
The public domain is "[t]he realm of publications,
inventions, and processes that are not protected by copyright or
patent. Things in the public domain can be appropriated by anyone
without liability or infringement."33 Works in the public domain are
"free as the air to common use."34 Once a work enters the public
27. 17 U.S.C. § 23 (1909), reprinted in NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, app. 6
[hereinafter all citations to the 1909 Act refer to the reprinted source in NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT];
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.01[B].
28. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1909).
29. 17 U.S.C. §§ 24, 26 (1909); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003).
30. In 1976, Congress changed the statutory scheme to a "life plus" measure of copyright
term, which lasted until fifty years after the author's death. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194-95. In
1998, Congress again extended the duration of the limited monopoly to seventy years after the
death of the author. Id. at 195. Additionally, the duration of the copyright term now depends on
factors such as whether the work was anonymous, pseudonymous, or a work made for hire. Id.;
17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (2004). Moreover, under current law, copyrights secured prior to 1978 that
did not expire before 1978 extend ninety-five years from the date of publication. 17 U.S.C. §
304(a)-(b).
31. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
32. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir.
1999).
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1243 (7th ed. 1999); see also 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1909) ("No
copyright shall subsist in the original text of any work which is in the public domain .... "). See
generally Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215
(2002) (providing extended discussion of the public domain).
34. Cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973) (quoting Int'l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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domain, a former owner cannot reclaim copyright protection. 35 A large
number of works are in the public domain, 36 including Shakespeare's
plays and poems, 37 Carroll's .ALICEIN WONDERLAND, 38 and the music
of Beethoven. 39 Today, the rise of the internet and digital archives
promotes access to such works. 40 One of the primary legitimate uses
of internet file-swapping technology like Kazaa is the sharing of public
41
domain works.
The Supreme Court has recognized the role of the public
domain and the limited monopoly in fulfilling the dual policies of the
Patent and Copyright Clause, concluding that the limited monopoly "is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by
the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control
has expired." 42 After all, the public domain is a place where ideas can
43
be disseminated free from the "evils" of the limited monopoly.
2. Fair Use
Another means of implementing the dual policies of the 1909
Act is the public's right to the "fair use" of a copyright owner's work.
Fair use traditionally has been defined as "a privilege in others than
the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent."4 4
In 1976, Congress,
intending to restate the common law doctrine of fair use, provided that
35. See Graham v. John Deere & Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) ("Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to
restrict free access to materials already available."). However, certain works of a foreign origin
can be restored from the public domain. 17 U.S.C. § 104(A) (2004); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 10, § 9A.04[A][4].
36. For example, Project Gutenberg provides an online database of over 13,000 public
domain works. Project Gutenberg, home page, at http://www.gutenberg.org (last visited Jan. 5,
2005).
37. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (C.D.
Cal. 2003), aff'd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
38. Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. Souvaine Selective Pictures, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 774, 775
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
39. See Lownebach v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 715 (1987) (business venture
involving recording of a Beethoven symphony that was in the public domain).
40. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161-62 (9th
Cir. 2004) (discussing the sharing of public domain works through internet file-swapping
technology).
41. Id. Kazaa offers internet file-swapping technology that allows works to be exchanged
for free, regardless of whether the works are copyrighted or not. See, e.g., Kazaa, P2P Software
User Advisories, at http://www.kazaa.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
42. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
43. See supra text accompanying note 22.
44. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
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fair use includes "such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by [another section of the 1976
Copyright Act], for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research." 45
For example, the use of home
videocassette recorders to record television programs for later viewing
46
is a fair use of the copied program.
The public's right of fair use, which predates the 1909 Act, has
been considered necessary to fulfilling the constitutional goal of
promoting "the Progress of Science and useful Arts."47 After all,
"[e]very book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used
before." 48 The Supreme Court's analysis of the fair use doctrine
largely involves consideration of copyright's dual purposes. In such
cases, the Court evaluates four factors: the purpose of the use, the
nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the
portion used, and the potential harm to the demand or potential
demand for the copyrighted work. 49 The Court has concluded that the
most important factor is the fourth factor-the potential harm to the
demand or potential demand for the copyrighted work. 50 This factor
involves the balancing of the economic incentive of the limited
monopoly with the free dissemination of ideas. 51 Thus, the fair use
doctrine is a means of implementing the dual policies of the 1909 Act.
D. Significance of Publication Under the 1909 Act
The concept of publication also had a crucial role in the
promotion of the 1909 Act's dual policies due to its immense
importance to the Act. 52 Under the 1909 Act, at the time of a work's

45. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
46. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 456.
47. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575.
48. Id. (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436)).
49. Id. at 578-90; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004) (listing these four nonexclusive factors).
50. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (The effect on
the market "is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use .....
51.

See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 450-51:

[A] use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of,
the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive
to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to
ideas without any countervailing benefit ... [Elvery commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright ....
52. Cf. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.01 ("The concept of publication was of
immense importance under the 1909 Act.").
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53
creation, an author acquired common law copyright protection.
Common law copyright offered owners various rights, including the
right to the privacy of the work 54 and the right of first publication, 55
and numerous forms of relief from infringement, 56 including unfair
competition, 57 unjust enrichment, 58 and conversion. 59 This common
law protection continued until the work was published. 60 Upon
publication, a work either entered the public domain, or, if the author
and/or owner complied with the 1909 Act's formalities,6 1 its common
62
law protection converted into a federal statutory copyright.
Thus, publication is "generally a condition precedent to
obtaining statutory protection under the 1909 Act." 63 Certain rights

53. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1909); Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211,
1214 (11th Cir. 1999). The current 1976 Act largely preempts state common law copyright.
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 8C.02. However, most states continue to recognize
state common law copyright, at least with respect to sound recordings created prior to February
15, 1972, which are not protected by federal copyright law. Id. at § 8C.03; see also infra notes 5759. But see Corporate Catering, Inc. v. Corporate Catering, Etc., No. M1997-00230-COA-R3-CV,
2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 186, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2001) (holding that state common
law copyright actions no longer exist in Tennessee).
54. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.03. In the context of property, the right of
privacy is the right of a "person's property to be free from unwarranted public scrutiny and
exposure." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1325 (7th ed. 1999).
55. "[C]ommon law copyright was often referred to as the right of first publication" because
publication divested the owner's common law copyright under the 1909 Act. NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.01[B].
56. For a general discussion of the role of common law copyright under the 1909 Act, see
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552-71 (1973).
57. A & M Records, Inc. v. M.V.C. Distrib. Corp., 574 F.2d 312, 313-14 (6th Cir. 1978),
superceded by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2004); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, §
8C.03 n.7 (listing additional cases).
58. Rodgers v. Roulette Records, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 731, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
59. CBS, Inc. v. Garrod, 622 F. Supp. 532, 536 (M.D. Fla. 1985); Schafer v. RMS Realty, 741
N.E.2d 155, 182-86 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Wellington Sys., Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 714 A.2d
21, 31 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998); Conant v. Karris, 520 N.E.2d 757, 763 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987); In re
Corbin, 391 So. 2d 731, 732-33 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980). But see B & L Corp. v. Thomas &
Thorngren, Inc., 917 S.W.2d 674, 679-81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (not recognizing conversion as a
cause of action for intangible property rights).
60. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.01[B].
61. The statutory formalities of the 1909 Act are "fairly simple," requiring essentially the
application of a notice of copyright on the tangible embodiments of a work and the deposit of two
copies of the work in the U.S. Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 13 (1909); NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 7.01[A]; Herman F. Selvin, Should PerformanceDedicate?, 42 CAL.
L. REV. 40, 40 (1954).
62. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir.
1999); see also 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1909) ("Any person entitled thereto by this title may secure
copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this
title ...").
63. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.01[B]. Registration, not publication, was a
condition precedent to statutory copyright for unpublished works under section 12 of the 1909
Act. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 7.16 [c][i].
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and responsibilities mentioned above 64 accompanied publication for
works in compliance with the statutory formalities, including the
rights to perform and to copy and the requirements to provide a notice
of copyright and to deposit two copies of the work. 65 Publication also
started the clock on the limited monopoly. 66 Publication, therefore,
had to occur simultaneously with an author's receiving the statutory
benefit of his limited monopoly.
A key determinant of the significance of publication in a given
67
case depends on whether the 1909 Act or the 1976 Act governs.
Deciding which of the two Acts to apply turns on the date of
publication of the work at issue. If a work was published before
January 1, 1978, the 1909 Act governs. 68 On the other hand, if a work
69
was published on or after January 1, 1978, the 1976 Act governs.
Works created before January 1, 1978, but not published before that
70
date are governed by the 1976 Act.
III. ANALYSIS: THE UNSETTLED DEFINITION OF PUBLICATION
The concept of publication maintains great significance under
the 1909 Act partly because the 1909 Act does not define publication. 71
The definition of publication remains an unsettled area of law that has
73
been labeled "arcane" 72 and "clouded by semantic confusion."
Melville B. Nimmer's almost fifty-year-old observation that
publication is "a legal word of art, denoting a process much more
esoteric than is suggested by the lay definition of the term" remains

64. See supra text accompanying note 28.
65. 17 U.S.C. §§ 9-10, 13 (1909).
66. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 24, 26 (1909) (measuring the copyright term based on the date of
publication).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 18-28.
68. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2004) (providing terms of copyrights subsisting on January
1, 1978).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2004).
70. Id. On the other hand, some courts have determined that "[w]orks created before
January 1, 1978 ...are governed by the Copyright Act of 1909." E.g., Archie Comic Publ'n, Inc.
v. DeCarlo, 258 F. Supp. 2d 315, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300,
slip op. at 13 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003). This conclusion is inaccurate in some cases because,
under section 303(a), works created before January 1, 1978, "but not theretofore in the public
domain or copyrighted" are governed by the 1976 Act. 17 U.S.C. § 303(a).
71. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.04 (noting that Congress intentionally
omitted the definition of publication under the 1909 Act). Congress apparently omitted the
definition due to "the difficulty of defining the term with respect to works of art where no copies
are reproduced." Id. at n.5.
72. Am. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 1981).
73. Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 946 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975).
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just as true today. 74 In fact, courts and scholars have offered
numerous definitions, often with significant differences. The following
subsection discusses leading definitions of publication.
A. Leading Definitions of Publication
The closest that the 1909 Act comes to defining publication is
its definition of the "date of publication" in section 26 as "the earliest
date when copies of the first authorized edition were placed on sale,
sold, or publicly distributed by the proprietor of the copyright under
his authority." 75 However, construing section 26 as the definition of
publication has several problems. First, relying on section 26 as the
definition of publication ignores Congress's decision not to include a
definition of publication in the 1909 Act. 76 Moreover, courts have held
repeatedly that this phrase does not define publication but only marks
the date that a limited monopoly begins to run. 77 Additionally, the list
of types of exploitations in section 26 is under-inclusive because
section 26 does not include various acts that courts regularly consider
a publication, such as leasing a work or offering to sell or to distribute
7
the work, even if the sale or distribution does not occur. 8
Furthermore, this definition does not allow for the exploitation of the
original work, as opposed to copies of the work, to constitute
publication, a result at odds with the dual policies of the 1909 Act and
the general consensus among courts and scholarship. 79 For example,
the sale of an original painting should constitute publication in the
same way that the sale of copies of the original constitutes
publication.80 This result is consistent with the 1909 Act's dual
policies because the sale of a painting generates an economic incentive
for the artist to create the work.

74. Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 185, 185 (1956). The
"lay" definition of publication is: "(1) The act or process of publishing printed matter. (2) An
issue of printed material offered for sale or distribution. (3) Communication of information to the
public." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1106 (3d ed. 1997).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1909).
76. See supra note 71.
77. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.04; e.g., Pub. Affairs Assoc., Inc. v. Rickover,
284 F.2d 262, 269-70 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Cardinal Film Corp. v. Beck, 248 F. 368, 368 (S.D.N.Y.
1918).
78. See infra text accompanying note 82.
79. See infra discussion at notes 80, 82.
80. See Pierce & Bushnell Mfg. Co. v. Werckmeister, 72 F. 54, 56 (1st Cir. 1896) ("In the
case of a book, map, engraving, or photograph, it is commonly published in multiple form; in the
case of a painting or statue, it may or may not be published in multiple form."); see also infra
note 82.

868

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:857

A second option is an often-cited definition coined in Melville
Nimmer's classic 1956 article "Copyright Publication."8 1 Nimmer
stated that "publication occurs when by consent of the copyright owner
the original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given
away, or otherwise made available to the general public, or when an
authorized offer is made to dispose of the work in any such manner
even if a sale or other such disposition does not in fact occur."8 2 This
definition has many strengths, including its more expansive list of
acts of exploitation that constitute publication than those provided in
section 26 and its determination that, before publication may occur,
the copyright owner must consent to the acts of exploitation. This
definition allows, for instance, the authorized placement of "film
prints in regional distribution offices for rental to anyone" to
constitute publication.8 3 Additionally, the authorized and unrestricted
distribution of photographs of a sculpture would be a publication of
84
the work.
Nimmer's definition, however, limits publication to situations
involving the original or tangible copies of a work.8 5 Thus, under this
81. Courts that have quoted this definition or a variation of it include the following: Am.
Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981); Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc.,
523 F.2d 941, 945 (2d Cir. 1975); Kramer v. Newman, 749 F. Supp. 542, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Testa v. Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198, 201-02 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Dowdey v. Phoenix Films, Inc., 199
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 579, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F. Supp. 1241,
1248 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976).
82. Nimmer, supra note 74, at 187; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.04
(quoting same).
83. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Rubinowitz, No. CV 81 0925, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17553,
at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 1981) (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.11[B]
(1978)).
84. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.09 n.7.
85. For courts that appear to have adopted the tangible-intangible distinction, see supra
note 81. Courts that have not adhered to this distinction include: Estate of Martin Luther King,
Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999) (determining that "a general
publication may occur if the work is exhibited or displayed in such a manner as to permit
unrestricted copying by the general public"); Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Pub. Bldg.
Comm'n of Chicago, 320 F. Supp. 1303, 1311 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (holding that "the display of [a
model of a sculpture] constituted general publication"); Mayhew v. Allsup, No. 3:96-1081, slip op.
at 14 (M.D. Tenn. July 24, 2001) (determining that "[p]laying a song on the radio, so long as it is
not merely a performance, would constitute 'publication'...."); King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No.
3:00-0300, slip op. at 18 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003) (holding that radio play constitutes
publication); see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 300 (1907) ("We do not
mean to say that the public exhibition of a painting or statue, where all might see and freely copy
it, might not amount to publication .. "); Burke v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 598 F.2d 688, 691 (1st
Cir. 1979) ("A general publication occurs when a work is made available to members of the public
at large without regard to who they are or what they propose to do with it."); Patterson v.
Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 1937) ("The test of general publication is whether
the exhibition of the work to the public is under such conditions as to show dedication without
reservation of rights or only the right to view or inspect it without more."); Logicom Inclusive,
Inc. v. Stewart & Co., 04 Civ. 0604, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15668, at *17 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,
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definition, neither the broadcast of a film on television,8 6 the radio
play of a song,8 7 the unrestricted public display of a sculpture,8 8 nor
the licensing of a work for exploitation8 9 would constitute publication
because none involves the distribution of the original or a tangible
embodiment of a work. Nimmer cited two rationales for this tangibleintangible distinction, each of which is questionable. First, he wrote
that the distinction is:
[C]onsistent with the principle that publication is the act of rendering the work common
property. Only a dissemination of a work which permits members of the public to obtain
the right of physical control and enjoyment of the work justifies the legal conclusion that
the work (as distinguished from the tangible copy embodying the work) is common
90
property.

This principle as stated is somewhat inaccurate. Publication
can render a work common property if publication dedicates the work
to the public domain. 9 1 However, when a work is copyrighted,
publication merely allows the public access to the work, subject to
certain restrictions, such as payment for the use of the work and a
prohibition on copying the work for resale. 92 Moreover, when a work
is protected, the copyright owner still maintains unique rights that
the public does not share, such as the right to receive royalties from
2004) ("Under the 1909 Act, a general publication was 'such a dissemination of the work of art
itself among the public, as to justify the belief that it took place with the intention of rendering
such work common property..."' (quoting Am. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1027 (9th
Cir. 1981))); Michael B. Landau, "Publication,"Musical Compositions, and the Copyright Act of
1909: Still Crazy After All These Years, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 29, 31-32 (Winter 2000) ("A
general publication could occur when the work was made available to indiscriminate members of
the public, without regard for what they intended to do with it."); cf. ABKCO Music, Inc. v.
Stellar Records, Inc. 96 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1996) ("While projecting lyrics on a screen and
producing printed copies of the lyrics, of course, have their differences, there is no reason to treat
them differently for purposes of the Copyright Act [of 1976].").
86. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08[A]. Instead, the broadcast of a film on
television would constitute a non-divesting performance. For a discussion of performance and
publication in the context of film, see infra notes 167-195, 321-345.
87. Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1344, 1350 (1986) (asserting that radio broadcasts
of the Amos 'n' Andy Show did not constitute publication), vacated, 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989).
88. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.09 ("[T]he better view under the 1909 Act
may have been that public display of a work of art does not constitute a publication
thereof ...").
89. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Rubinowitz, No. CV 81 0925, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17553, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 1981) (holding that the exploitation of the Star Trek series
pursuant to a license did not constitute publication).
90. Nimmer, supra note 74, at 197; see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284,
299-300 (1907) (" 'It is a fundamental rule that to constitute publication there must be such a
dissemination of the work of art itself among the public, as to justify the belief that it took place
with the intention of rendering such work common property.' " (quoting SLATER ON THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT AND TRADE MARK 92)).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1909).
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its exploitation. 93 Thus, absent forfeiture into the public domain, a
work is not "common property."
Nimmer's second rationale is that the distinction provides "a
relatively clear and unequivocal standard which, if consistently
applied, would do much to bring a certainty and predictability to a
difficult phase of copyright law."94 Although bright-line rules do have
merit to the extent that they provide legal certainty, adherence to this
bright-line rule has four primary problems. First, the rule has little, if
any, utility. Any utility of the tangible-intangible distinction breaks
down in the context of fair use of authorized broadcasts of a work on
television or radio. When a person views a movie on television, an
intangible "embodiment of the copyrighted work has found its way
into third-parties' hands."9 5 The viewer may legally render that
intangible embodiment tangible by recording it onto a video cassette
for the purpose of "home time-shifting," however, which is the practice
of recording a program that one cannot view at the time it is televised
in order to watch it at a later time. 96 Likewise, members of the public
should be permitted to listen to recordings broadcast on the radio and
to copy them for home time-shifting, 97 so long as the audio taping is
not done for "librarying purposes" that have a "harmful impact upon
the potential market for the sale of those sound recordings." 98
Following the same rationale, a viewer should be able to watch a film
and transcribe the screenplay onto a piece of paper, so long as she does
93. Id.
94. Nimmer, supra note 74, at 197.
95. David Nimmer, The Continuing Significance of Publication, in 1 NIMMER REP. ON
COPYRIGHT 2 (2001).
96. The Supreme Court has held that "home time-shifting" is a permissible fair use. Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421, 455 (1984). The court reasoned
that "time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to
witness in its entirety free of charge ....
Id. at 449. Moreover, "the time-shifter no more steals
the program by watching it once than does the live viewer." Id. at 450 n.33.
97. The Tenth Circuit has concluded that the public's right to record songs off the radio
extends beyond home time-shifting to general personal use. United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d
1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Members of the public are allowed to listen to [recordings of songs
taken off the radio] when broadcast and to make a copy for their own personal use, but not to
make numerous copies and sell them commercially .. "). The legislative history of a 1971
amendment to the 1909 Act supports the 10th Circuit's determination:
[I]t is not the intention of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home
recording is for private use and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise
capitalizing commercially on it. This practice is common and unrestrained today, and
the record producers and performers would be in no different position from that of the
owners of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the past 20 years.
H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 7 (1971).
98. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 8B.01[D][2] (arguing that audio taping for
"librarying" purposes would not be a fair use).

2005]

COPYRIGHT DtJA VU

871

so only for a personal use that does not adversely impact the potential
market for the screenplay. Similarly, even inexperienced musicians
can listen to a song on the radio and transcribe the words and music
onto sheet music. 99
Although the technology for rendering intangible embodiments
tangible was not as widespread before 1978 as it is today, 100 many
people possessed the capability. 10 1 For example, those who recorded
music to make phonograph records for commercial distribution could
have also recorded music off the radio. Likewise, those who viewed a
film or listened to a song could have transcribed the screenplay or
music onto paper in 1965 like they can in 2005. Moreover, the number
of people who receive access to the work is not significant.1 0 2 Instead,
what matters is that "such copies as are available must be offered to
10 3
all members of the public who are interested."'
Second, the tangible-intangible
distinction upsets the
Congressional balance between the dual policies of the 1909 Act. On
the one hand, the revenue generated from broadcasting a song on the
radio or a film on television is precisely the type of economic incentive
°
contemplated by the 1909 Act for authors to create their works 104
Authors and copyright owners can reap huge financial rewards from
such broadcasts, 10 5 and, therefore, those acts of exploitation should

99. This phenomenon is manifested by the existence of websites such as www.olga.net,
which is an online archive of sheet music for guitars compiled by individuals, including "amateur
contributors," who listened to songs, wrote down the chords or tablatures, and submitted them to
the online archive. OLGA (On-Line Guitar Archive), About Olga, at http://www.olga.net/about/
(last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
100. For instance, the relatively recent widespread use of audio and video recorders has
facilitated the ease with which individuals can render intangible embodiments of works tangible.
101. In 1971, a House Report, for example, concluded that home recording of songs off the
radio is "common and unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers would be in
no different position from that of the owners of copyright in recorded musical compositions over
the past 20 years." H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 7 (1971). Thus, by 1971, the public apparently had
the ability to record songs off the radio, did so, and possessed that capability during the prior
twenty years.
102. Nimmer, supra note 74, at 187 (Publication "may be effected by sale or other
distribution of a single copy" of a work).
103. Id.

104. See supra discussion at notes 20-26.
105. See J.A.M., All About Copyright, Music and Money: Performing Rights Payments, at
http://www.ascap.com/jam/read_about/mm-performing.cfm (last visited Aug. 26, 2004):
One of the greatest sources of income for songwriters and publishers is the money in
royalty payments received from performing rights societies around the world. ....
When a song is played on the radio, on television, in a stadium, in a restaurant, over
the Internet, etc., that is a "performance," and the radio or television station, stadium,
etc., owes a royalty to the writer and publisher of the music.
Of the $3-billion-plus generated worldwide each year, the U.S. performing right
organizations account for approximately $1 billion in collections ....
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constitute publication in the same way that a distribution of a video or
audio cassette constitutes publication. 10 6 On the other hand, an
author who authorized the broadcast of a song on the radio or a movie
on television without distributing tangible copies of the work could
have avoided triggering the commencement of the federal copyright
term because the dissemination of intangible copies of a work would
not have constituted publication. Therefore, this author could have
obtained a monopoly in the work of a potentially much longer duration
than he would have received by complying immediately with the 1909
Act.
For example, if an author released a song for radio-play in 1920
but did not otherwise exploit it, that song "would have been protected
by common law copyright until the 1976 Act took effect on January 1,
1978. On that date, pursuant to § 303(a) of the new 1976 Act, federal
protection would have started," 10 7 and the song would be protected at
least until December 2002.108 If the work were published between
January 1, 1978 and December 31, 2002, the work would have
achieved copyright protection at least until December 2047.109 This
regime provides the song copyright protection for a term of at least
eighty-two years in the former situation and at least one hundred and
twenty-seven years in the latter circumstance. 110 "Had the [song] been
'published' in the year it was first written and [broadcast on the
radio], however, the maximum protection would have been for 56
years." '
Thus, in this instance, adhering to the tangible-intangible
distinction can more than double the term of copyright protection.
Such a result upsets Congress's balance of the dual policies of the 1909

106. See Am. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
publication of a motion picture occurs "when copies of a film are placed in the regional exchanges
for distribution to theatre operators").
107. This illustration is based on an example developed in Professor Landau's article supra
note 85, at 33. Prior to the 1976 Act, noncompliance with the statutory formalities would have
led to owners having perpetual monopolies in their works under the common law. Id. at 30-31.
However, the 1976 Act converted common law copyrights into statutory copyrights. NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.01. Thus, a copyright owner may no longer obtain a perpetual
monopoly in a work, but may still receive a monopoly of a much longer duration than an author
would have if he had complied immediately with the 1909 Act's formalities. See La Cienega
Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 1995), superceded by 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2004)
(describing a circumstance where an author may "receive 'longer' copyright protection").
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2004) ("In no case, however, shall the term of copyright in [a
work created before January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the public domain or copyrighted]
expire before December 31, 2002 .... ").
109. See id. ("[I]f the work is published on or before December 31, 2002, the term of copyright
shall not expire before December 31, 2047.").
110. Landau, supra note 85, at 33.

111. Id.
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Act by greatly increasing the author's incentive to create at the
expense of the public's ability to gain full access to the work.
This example illustrates the third and fourth problems of the
tangible-intangible distinction. The distinction rewards those who did
not comply with the formalities of the 1909 Act, while essentially
penalizing those who did. 112 Moreover, the distinction allows courts to
circumvent the explicit statutory limit of copyright protection under
the 1909 Act. Doubling the statutory term of copyright protection
amounts to judicial overreaching on a substantial scale.
A possible point of debate is the value of this type of extended
monopoly. Under the current 1976 Act, an author and/or owner must
register a work prior to any infringement in order to recover statutory
damages from such an infringement. 113 Based on this rule, the
inability to recover statutory damages could significantly decrease the
value of this type of extended monopoly. The 1909 Act, however, has a
different rule that allows statutory damages to be "obtained if
registration occurred prior to the filing of the action, even if no
' 114 Thus, the author in
registrationexisted at the time of infringement."
the above example could generate revenue from radio play without
registering the work. In the event that someone infringed on the
work, the author could then register the song and recover damages in
a lawsuit under the 1909 Act. This author would get the dual benefits
of statutory damages and an extended monopoly.
In addition, under the 1909 Act, the author of an unpublished
work retained the protection of common law copyright. 11 5 Instead of
complying with statutory formalities and thereby starting the clock on
the limited monopoly, the author could have relied upon common law
protection, for example, by filing a suit against the infringer for unfair
competition or unjust enrichment. 1 6 If the author obtained relief
under common law, he could have continued to postpone registration
and could have obtained an additional extension on the limited
monopoly. In the event that he failed to obtain such relief, he could

112. See La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953 (determining that the rule that the sale of phonorecords
does not constitute publication "reduces the incentive to immediate compliance with the 1909
Act" by encouraging "artists to delay compliance with the Copyright Act's requirements and
thereby receive 'longer' copyright protection").
113. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 14.04[D].
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Section 2 of the 1909 Act provides that "[n]othing in this title shall be construed to
annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in
equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent,
and to obtain damages therefore." 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1909) (emphasis added); see also NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 7.16[c][ii] (discussing same).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
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have simply registered the work and pursued damages under the 1909
Act, so long as res judicata did not bar the subsequent action, thus
potentially gaining both statutory damages and an extended monopoly
(albeit a shorter monopoly than he could have gained without
registering altogether).
A third definition espoused by David Nimmer is that
publication "means that a tangible embodiment of the copyrighted
work has found its way into third-parties' hands." 117 This definition
suffers from the problems discussed above pertaining to the tangibleintangible distinction. 118 For example, the broadcast of a song on
radio or a film on television would not constitute publication under
David Nimmer's definition, even though such acts of exploitation
generate the type of economic incentive for authors envisioned in the
1909 Act. 119 Another flaw of this definition is that it does not
explicitly require the author's authorization of the work's exploitation.
Although authorization is implied in Nimmer's interpretation of the
definition, 120 under the definition's plain language, an unauthorized
use of the composition could constitute publication. Such a result is at
odds with the policy of the 1909 Act of rewarding authors with a
limited monopoly that gives them control of the work's exploitation for
a limited time.' 2' After all, if a copyright owner had no control over
the exploitation of his work, the copyright would be virtually
worthless, and would provide authors with little incentive to create
additional works.
A fourth definition stems from the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., where the
majority opinion established two tests for determining when
publication occurs. 122 First, "publication occurs if tangible copies of
the work are distributed to the general public in such a manner as
1 23
allows the public to exercise dominion and control over the work.'
This prong of the test has the problem analyzed above of adhering to
the tangible-intangible distinction 24 It also does not expressly
require the copyright owner's authorization of the work. Moreover,
117. Nimmer, supra note 95, at 2.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 85-116.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26; see also note 105.
120. David Nimmer described, for instance, an artist who offers to sell his paintings as an
example of publication. Nimmer, supra note 95, at 3. In this example, the artist's authorization
is clearly implied. Id.
121. For a discussion of the dual policies of the 1909 Act, see supra text accompanying notes
20-26.
122. 194 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999).
123. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 85-116.
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under this definition, the exploitation of the original does not
constitute publication. 125
Second, "publication may occur if the work is exhibited or
displayed in such a manner as to permit unrestricted copying by the
general public. ' 126 This second test has the benefit of evading the
tangible-intangible distinction.
Accordingly, in applying this
definition, one district court has twice held that "[p]laying a song on
the radio, so long as it is not merely a performance, would constitute
'publication' because the song would have been 'exhibited or displayed
in such a manner as to permit unrestricted copying by the general
public." ' 127 However, the primary problem with this test is that it fails
to take into account the intent of the author and/or owner of the work
and, apparently, would allow an unauthorized use of the work to
constitute publication.
In his concurrence in Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v.
CBS, Inc., Judge Julian Cook applied a fifth definition of publication,
128
which is provided in the 1976 Act:
"Publication" is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale
or transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies
or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public
performance, or public display, constitutes publication.
A public performance.. . of a
29
work does not of itself constitute publication.1

This definition is generally considered a codification of the
common law. 130 However, applying the 1976 Act's definition to the
1909 Act is manifestly erroneous. Congress never intended for the
1976 Act's definition to be applied to the 1909 Act but, instead,
formulated the 1976 definition as part of its revamping of U.S.
copyright law.' 3 ' Moreover, the 1976 Act's definition has several

125. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
126. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1215.
127. King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip. op. at 16-17 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003);
Mayhew v. Allsup, No. 3:96-1081, slip. op. at 14 (M.D. Tenn. July 24, 2001).
128. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F,3d at 1221 (Cook, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). The dissent implicitly agreed with this definition by endorsing the lower
court's adoption of this definition. Id. at 1227 (Roney, J., dissenting); Estate of Martin Luther
King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 1998), rev'd, 194 F.3d 1211 (11th
Cir. 1999).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004); Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1221 (Cook,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
130. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1221 (Cook, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.04 (concluding that the
1976 Act's definition of publication "in general constitutes a codification of the definition evolved
by case law prior to adoption of' the 1976 Act).
131. See generally NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.01 (discussing the differences
between the definitions of publication under the 1976 and 1909 Acts).
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differences with pre-1978 case law 132 and, when applied to the 1909
Act, shares many problems with the above-discussed proposals. For
example, the 1976 definition does not refer to the owner's
authorization of the work's exploitation, although the owner's
authorization is implied. 133 Moreover, the 1976 Act's definition draws
a distinction between tangible and intangible embodiments of a work
that presents the problems discussed above. 134 Thus, under this
definition, the broadcast of a song on radio or film on television is not
publication. 135 Also, the definition of publication under the 1976 Act
allows the distribution of phonorecords 136 to constitute publication, a
result that is clearly precluded under the 1909 Act due to
Congressional action in 1997.137 The sale of phonograph records, for
instance, constitutes publication under the 1976 Act's definition, but
138
does not under the 1909 Act.
In the fall of 2003, a district court in Tennessee established a
sixth definition. 139 The court held that "[t]he key to determining that
publication of a work has occurred under the 1909 Act is a finding that
the owner of the copyright authorized the distribution and/or
exhibition of the work for unlimited use, enjoyment, or copying by the
general public."'140 This formulation has the benefits of avoiding
Nimmer's tangible-intangible limitation and of requiring the owner's
authorization for publication. However, this definition appears to
read the limited publication doctrine extremely broadly because there
132. Id.
133. Id. § 4.04 ("Congress could not have intended that the various legal consequences of
publication under the current Act would be triggered by the unauthorized act of an infringer or
other stranger to the copyright.").
134. 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines, in pertinent part, copies and phonorecords as "material objects"
in which a work is "fixed." Section 101 further provides that "[a] work is 'fixed' in a tangible
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord . . . is sufficiently
permanent or stable .... Thus, the 1976 definition adheres to the tangible-intangible
distinction, providing that publication can occur only upon the exploitation of a tangible
embodiment of the work. See also infra text accompanying notes 231-236 on distribution of
phonorecords. In addition, for the problems associated with the tangible-intangible distinction,
see supra text accompanying notes 85-116.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 85-116.
136. For the definition of "phonorecords," see infra text accompanying note 226.
137. The 1997 amendment provides that "[t]he distribution before January 1, 1978, of a
phonorecord shall not for any purpose constitute a publication of the musical work embodied
therein."
17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2004).
For an analysis of section 303(b), see infra text
accompanying notes 196-236, 270-287.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004) (providing that the distribution of phonorecords constitutes
publication under the 1976 Act); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Lavere, 217 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the distribution of phonorecords does not constitute publication under the 1909
Act).
139. King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 17 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003).
140. Id.
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would seem to be no publication if the distribution or exhibition is
limited in any way.14 ' Moreover, in providing that the distribution of
a work constitutes publication, this definition may run afoul of
Congress's provision that the distribution of musical works embodied
142
in phonorecords does not constitute publication.
B. Exploitations of a Work not ConstitutingPublication
Although courts have failed to reach a consensus on a single
definition of publication, courts generally agree that some acts of
exploitation do not constitute publication.
1. Limited Publication
In order to soften the occasional harshness of publication
destroying common law rights, courts created a distinction between
"general publication"'143 and "limited publication."'144 Limited
publication does not destroy common law copyright, whereas general
publication does. 145 A limited publication is "one that communicated
the contents of a work to a select group and for a limited purpose, and
1 46
without the right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale."'
The limited purpose can be express or implied from the
47
circumstances. 1
The key elements in determining whether a particular
exploitation constitutes a general or limited publication hinge on
distribution to a "select group" for a "limited purpose."'148 For example,
a restricted list of parties who may negotiate to exploit a work
141. For a discussion of the limited publication doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes
143-152.
142. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2004) (providing that the distribution of phonorecords
embodying musical compositions does not constitute publication). The King Records court quoted
section 303(b) but did not incorporate the statutory limitation into its definition of publication.
King Records, Inc., No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 17.
143. This Note is primarily concerned with general publication and, accordingly,
predominantly refers to "general publication" simply as "publication."
144. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir.
1999); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supranote 10, § 4.13[A].
145. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1214 ("Only a general publication
divested a common law copyright.").
146. Id. at 1214-15; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.13[A] (defining
limited publication as a publication "which communicates the contents of a manuscript to a
definitely selected group and for a limited purpose, without the right of diffusion, reproduction,
distribution or sale."); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts and Sci. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc.,
944 F.2d 1446, 1451-54 (9th Cir. 1991) (providing extended discussion of limited publication).
147. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.13[A] [2].
148. See supra note 146.
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constitutes a select group, 49 whereas negotiating with any interested
party for exploitation rights would not. 150 Moreover, a limited
publication occurs "if an author distributes copies of his work to a
circle of immediate friends with the express or implied understanding
that such copies will not be duplicated or circulated .... ,,151 Likewise,
a limited publication occurs during a private screening of a movie
where the owner's intent to restrict its exhibition was communicated
52
to the viewers. 1
Some courts further distinguished between "divestive" and
"investive" publication. 153 A divestive publication is exploitation that
forfeited common law copyright, while an investive publication refers
to exploitation that secured a federal copyright. 154 To prevent the
harsh result of forfeiture, courts were more likely to find the latter
than the former:
[C]ourts apply different tests of publication depending on whether plaintiff is claiming
protection because he did not publish and hence has a common law claim of
infringement-in which case the distribution must be quite large to constitute
'publication'-or whether he is claiming under the copyright statute-in which case the
requirements for publication are quite narrow. In each case the courts appear so to
treat the concept of 'publication' as to prevent piracy. 155

This distinction has very rarely been "invoked as the basis of a
ruling, rather than dicta," however, and it suffers from the "inherent
vagueness" of determining
how large is "quite large" and how narrow
156
is "quite narrow."'
2. Performance
Although the 1909 Act is silent as to whether performance of a
work constitutes publication, the great weight of case law stands for
the proposition that performance is not a publication. 157 However,
149. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.13 [A][1].
150. Id.
151. Id. § 4.13[A].
152. Am. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that one
week screening of a film to the public was a limited publication).
153. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.13[C]. With the exception of this discussion
of divestive and investive publication, this paper exclusively uses the term "publication" to refer
to "divestive" publication.
154. Id.
155. Am. Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 744 (2d Cir. 1956).
156. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.13[C].
157. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir.
1999) ("Numerous cases stand for the proposition that the performance of a work is not a general
publication."); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08[A] (noting that the
prevailing rule is that performance is not publication); Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435
(1912) ('The public representation of a dramatic composition, not printed and published, does not
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exactly what the "performance" exception under the 1909 Act
encompasses has been subject to some debate. 158 On the one hand, it
is well established that the "oral dissemination" of a musical, literary,
159
or dramatic work constitutes performance and not publication.
Thus, publication does not occur upon the delivery of a sermon or
lecture 60 or the live rendition of a dramatic work16' or a musical
composition.162
On the other hand, there is some disagreement whether a
phonorecord 163 is a performance of the underlying work or is itself a
copy. 1 64
As discussed below,1 65 most courts have held that a
phonorecord is a copy of the underlying work and not merely a
"captured performance."' 66 After all, "equating phonograph records
' 67
and public performance is analytically questionable."'

deprive the owner of his common-law right, save by operation of statute. At common law, the
public performance of the play is not an abandonment of it to the public use."). Very few modern
cases have held the contrary. These include: Loew's, Inc. v. Superior Court, 115 P.2d 983, 985-87
(Cal. 1941); Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137, 142 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1949). For a strong
argument that performance should constitute publication, see generally Selvin, supra note 61.
Under the 1976 Act, "public performance" is explicitly excluded from the definition of
"publication." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
158. The term "performance" is broader under the 1976 Act than under the 1909 Act. Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 469 n.17 (1984). "To perform" is
defined in the 1976 Act as "to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of
any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its
images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
Section 101 defines performing "publicly" as follows:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered;
or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times.
159. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08[A].
160. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1215; Hemingway v. Random House,
Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 347 (N.Y. 1969); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supranote 10, § 4.08[A].
161. McCarthy & Fischer v. White, 259 F. 364, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 10, § 4.08[A].
162. Nutt v. Nat'l Inst., 31 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1929); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note
10, § 4.08[A].
163. For the definition of "phonorecord," see infra text accompanying note 226.
164. See infra notes 199, 208.
165. For a discussion on the distribution of musical work embodied in phonorecords, see infra
text accompanying notes 196-236.
166. See infra note 199.
167. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08[B].
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Likewise, courts have split as to whether the broadcasting of a
work on the radio or television constitutes performance or publication.
In a decision vacated by the Second Circuit, a New York district court
concluded that radio broadcasts of Amos 'n' Andy shows were not
publications because "the rendering of the performance before the
microphone cannot be held to be an abandonment of ownership to it by
the proprietors or a dedication of it to the public at large. 168
Similarly, according to some courts and Nimmer on Copyright,
publication does not occur upon the projection of a movie 169 or the
broadcasting of a script on radio170 or television.' 7' Yet a district court
in Tennessee held that the radio broadcasts of previously made studio
recordings constitute publications of the works based on the principle
that publication "may occur if the work is exhibited or displayed in
such a manner as to permit unrestricted copying by the general
172
public."
A basis for extending the performance exception to
broadcasting a previously made studio recording of a work over the
radio or television is found in judicial interpretation of section 1 of the
1909 Act. Section 1 gives a copyright owner the exclusive right to
perform a work publicly for profit. 173 A line of cases developed where a
party would broadcast a work over the radio or television without the
authorization of the copyright owner. 174 The copyright owner would
then sue, arguing that the broadcast violated his exclusive right to
perform the work publicly for profit. 75
Courts held that such
168. Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1344, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), vacated, 870 F.2d 40,
1989 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Uproar Co. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 8 F. Supp. 358, 362 (D. Mass. 1934),
modified, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1935)).
169. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08[A].
170. Silverman, 632 F. Supp. at 1350.
171. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08[A].
172. King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 16-18 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003)
(quoting Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir.
1999)); Mayhew v. Allsup, No. 3:96-1081, slip op. at 14 (M.D. Tenn. July 24, 2001); cf. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 492, 499 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. 1970):
In the giving of a speech or the rendering of a musical performance before large
audiences or via electronic media which transmit the sounds of voice or musical
instruments throughout the length and breadth of the land, it defies reason and
tortures the English language to say that under any circumstances such a knowing
transmittal by the performer or by the creator of the words and/or music is not a
publication.
173. Section 1 of the 1909 Act gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to perform
publicly for profit various types of works, including musical compositions, speeches, and
dramatic works. 17 U.S.C. § l(c)-(e) (1909).
174. E.g. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1968);
Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411, 411 (6th Cir. 1925).
175. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 393.
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broadcasts were public performances of the work for profit under the
following rationale:
A performance, in our judgment, is no less public because the listeners are unable to
communicate with one another, or are not assembled within an enclosure, or gathered
together in some open stadium or park or other public place. Nor can a performance, in
our judgment, be deemed private because each listener may enjoy it alone in the privacy
of his home. Radio broadcasting is intended to, and in fact does, reach a very much
larger number of the public at the moment of the rendition than any other medium of
and widely
performance. The artist is consciously addressing a great, though unseen
176
scattered, audience, and is therefore participating in a public performance.

Accordingly, in interpreting section 1, the Supreme Court has
177
repeatedly held that broadcasters perform but viewers do not.
The better view, however, is not importing judicial
interpretation of "public performance for profit" from section 1 into the
performance exception to the doctrine of publication. The rationales
behind the two performance doctrines are completely different. The
ability to perform publicly for profit is, by definition, a money-making
enterprise. 178 Having the exclusive right to do so is a significant part
of the economic incentive provided by the 1909 Act to authors. 179 On
the other hand, the performance exception to the doctrine of
publication is meant to alleviate the burden of complying with
statutory formalities prior to live performance. 8 0° Such a burden does
not exist where a previously made studio recording is broadcast on
radio or television.
Furthermore, language from a Supreme Court case addressing
public performance for profit under section 1 suggests that television
broadcast does, in fact, constitute publication:
Unlike propagators of other copyrighted material, such as those who sell books, perform
live dramatic productions, or project motion pictures to live audiences, holders of
copyrights for television programs or their licensees are not paid directly by those who
ultimately enjoy the publication of the material-thatis, the television viewers-but by
the drawing power of the copyrighted material to promote their
advertisers who use
181
goods and services.

Equating "television viewers" with "those who ultimately enjoy
the publication of the material" implies that a television broadcast of a
work constitutes publication, even though the television viewer does
176. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 158-59 (1975) (quoting Remick
& Co., 5 F.2d at 412).
177. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 403 (1974); Fortnightly
Corp., 392 U.S. at 398.
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 1(c)-(e) (1909) (describing right to perform publicly for profit); see also
supra note 105.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 182-185.
181. Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 411 (emphasis added).
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not receive a tangible embodiment of the work, such as a script or
video cassette.
Courts should determine whether a type of exploitation
constitutes performance based on a balancing of the practical benefits
of the performance exception and the dual policies of the 1909 Act.
The rule that performance does not constitute publication has
practical benefits in certain circumstances. For example, depositing a
copy of a work with the Copyright Office before live performance can
be burdensome.1 8 2 This is especially true with respect to certain
television, radio, and dramatic performances where last minute
changes are common.18 3 For example, "[t]o require a deposit in the
Copyright Office before permitting a revision to be performed in the
pre-Broadway runs or even thereafter would obviously seriously
hamper the development of the play." 18 4
On the other hand,
depositing a copy of musical work embodied on phonorecords presents
no great burden. 185
Some scholars have criticized the rule that performance does
not result in publication.1 8 6 In theory, performance should constitute
publication for the same reasons that any other act of exploitation
generally constitutes publication.18 7 After all, the revenues generated
from public performance of a work fulfill the 1909 Act's policy of
economically motivating the creativity of artists.18 8 For example, in
2002, a year of great economic uncertainty, Paul McCartney grossed
the year's highest sum of performance earnings of $126.2 million from
his live performances on his world tour.18 9 "If acts of exploitation of a
work constitute publication, and if the indicia of exploitation is the
realization of significant economic benefits, then it would seem that
182. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08[B].

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. For instance, Herman F. Selvin attacked the rule as wrong for several reasons:
Wrong because it is opposed to the policy to which the Constitution of this country has
committed us; because it makes out of the Copyright Act, insofar as it provides for
copyright of works not reproduced in copies for sale, not only a useless statute but a
positive detriment to the author who avails himself of its provisions; wrong because it
proceeds on a premise as to the common law which cannot be fully accepted as an
accurate statement of that law.
Selvin, supra note 61, at 51; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08[B] (arguing
that the rationale "for the basic doctrine of publication.., does not justify the rule that
performance is not a publication"); Landau, supra note 85, at 33 (asserting that application of the
performance exception "can lead to some strange and counterintuitive results").
187. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08[B].
188. See supratext accompanying notes 20-26.
189. Ray Waddell, The Top Tours of 2002, available at http://www.billboard.com/bb/yearend/
2002/touring.jsp (Aug. 27, 2004).
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performance should constitute publication."' 190 Perhaps the rule's
greatest problem is that it allows an owner an unauthorized extension
of the limited monopoly where the work is performed but never
otherwise exploited in a way that divests common law rights.1 91 One
commenter described this phenomenon based on a hypothetical play
written in 1910 and performed every year since then:
If the script itself were never published, it would have been protected by common law
copyright until the 1976 Act took effect on January 1, 1978. On that date, pursuant to §
303(a) of the new 1976 Act, federal protection would have started, and the play would be
protected at least until December 31, 2002, and if published after 1978, at least until
December 2047. This scheme gives the playwright protection for a term of at least 137
and performed,
years. Had the play been "published" in the year it was first 1written
92
however, the maximum protection would have been for 56 years.

The net effect of delayed compliance in this scenario is performance
revenues accompanied by a copyright lasting almost three times
1 93
longer than a copyright under the applicable statutory period.
Thus, because the rule upsets the balance of the 1909 Act's
dual policies, it should be limited to those situations in which either a
live performance is involved or situations in which practical
considerations warrant a broader interpretation of the term
"performance." For example, the live performance of a song before an
audience or over the radio should be considered a non-publishing
performance, 194 whereas the radio broadcast of a previously made
studio recording of a song should be considered a publication, not a
195
performance.
3. Distribution of Musical Work Embodied in Phonorecords
In 1997, Congress provided that "[t]he distribution before
January 1, 1978, of a phonorecord shall not for any purpose constitute
This
a publication of the musical work embodied therein." 196
amendment to the 1909 Act put to rest years of litigation concerning
190. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08[B].
191. See Selvin, supra note 61, at 40-41 (describing the extended monopoly an owner may
obtain because of the performance exception); see also supra notes 106-111.
192. Landau, supra note 85, at 33.
193. The value of this extended monopoly is protected by the ability of the owner to obtain
statutory damages even if he complied with the statutory formalities after the infringement. See
supra text accompanying notes 113-114. If the author decided not to comply, he could have
pursued his remedies under the doctrine of common law copyright. See supra text accompanying
notes 115-116.
194. See, e.g., Ferris v. Froham, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912) (holding that the live performance
of a play is not a publication).
195. See, e.g., King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 17 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22,
2003) (holding that radio play constitutes publication).
196. 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2004).
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the question of whether the sale or distribution of a phonorecord
constitutes publication of the underlying musical work. 197 The basis
for Congress's amendment is relevant, however, to the broader
question of whether any exploitations of musical work, in addition to
the distribution of sheet music, 198 can ever constitute publication.
Until the enactment of section 303(b), courts "were almost
unanimous in determining that public sale or other distribution of
phonorecords does constitute a publication .... ,,199 The most notable
exception is the Second Circuit's 1976 decision in Rosette v. Rainbo
Record Manufacturing Corp., which held that the sale of phonograph
records does not constitute publication because a phonograph record is
not a copy of the underlying composition. 200 Rosette relied heavily on
the Supreme Court's 1907 decision in White-Smith Music Publishing
Co. v. Apollo Co, 20 1 which held that a piano roll was not a copy of the
musical composition it embodied. 202 However, Rosette ignored the
Supreme Court's conclusion in its 1973 decision Goldstein v.
20 3
California that the 1909 Act effectively overruled White-Smith.
Goldstein concluded that "[h]enceforth, under § 1(e), records and piano

197. E.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Lavere, 217 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000); Mayhew v. Allsup, 166
F.3d 821 (6th Cir. 1999); La Cienega v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995), superceded by 17
U.S.C. § 303(b); Brown v. Tabb, 714 F.2d 1088 (11th Cir. 1983); Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg.
Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirmed on basis of
the district court's opinion).
198. The notion that the distribution of sheet music constitutes publication is
uncontroversial. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.05[B][7] (discussing a situation
where publication would not occur if sheet music were not released).
199. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.05[B][2]. The following cases that predate
the enactment of 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) hold that the sale or distribution of phonorecords constitutes
publication of the underlying musical composition. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953; Brown v. Tabb,
714 F.2d 1088, 1092 (11th Cir. 1983); Mayhew v. Gusto Records, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1302,
1308 (M.D. Tenn. 1997); Mills Music v. Cromwell Music, 126 F. Supp. 54, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473, 475 (N.D. Ill. 1950); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 10, § 4.05[B][2] n.30 (listing additional cases). Contra Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg.
Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1189-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), af/'d, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirmed on
basis of the district court's opinion); Nom Music, Inc. v. Kaslin, 227 F. Supp. 922, 926 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), affd on other grounds, 343 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1965). Thus, the conclusion that "for more
than half a century, it was generally accepted in a number of contexts that ... the sale of records
of a song did not oust common-law copyright" is inaccurate. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C.
GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 385 (6th ed. 2002) (espousing the quoted position).
200. Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1191-92.
201. Id. at 1189-92; White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
202. White-Smith Publ'g Co., 209 U.S. at 17-18.
203. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 565 (1973) (superceded by statute on other
grounds) ("After pointedly waiting for the Court's decision in White-Smith Music PublishingCo.,
Congress determined that the copyright statutes should be amended to insure that composers of
original musical works received adequate protection to encourage further artistic and creative
effort.").
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rolls were to be considered as 'copies' of the original composition they
were capable of reproducing, and could not be manufactured unless
20 4
payment was made to the proprietor of the composition copyright."
Accordingly, courts and scholarship have roundly criticized
Rosette.20 5 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT argues that Rosette is inconsistent
with the rationale of the 1909 Act because "an author in permitting
records of his work to be publicly marketed is certainly engaging in a
form of exploitation of his work and should therefore be required to
seek protection, if at all, only under the limited monopoly concept of
the federal Copyright Act." 20 6 In its unpublished decision in Leeds
Music Corp. v. Gusto Records, Inc.,20 7 the Sixth Circuit "expressly
repudiated" Rosette by determining that a recording of a monologue
could constitute a copy of the underlying composition. 20 8 Likewise, in
its 1995 decision La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, the Ninth Circuit
refused to follow Rosette because "Rosette reduces the incentive to
immediate compliance with the 1909 Act" by encouraging "artists to
delay compliance with the Copyright Act's requirements and thereby
receive 'longer' copyright protection. ' 20 9 In La Cienega, the Ninth
Circuit held that selling records constitutes publication of the
2 10
underlying compositions.
Rosette experienced somewhat of a resurrection due to
Congress's reaction to La Cienega. That decision provoked a flurry of
activity in Congress, sparking the view that La Cienega "placed a
cloud over the legal status of a large number of musical works." 21 1 The
legislative history suggests that Congress viewed La Cienega as an
aberration and out of step with the longstanding view of the Copyright
Office and the music industry.
For instance, the Register of
Copyrights testified before Congress:
204. Id. at 565-66.
205. E.g., La Cienega v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 1995), superceded by 17 U.S.C. §
303(b) (2004) (concluding that "Rosette is the minority rule; our research fails to reveal any other
circuit which has followed it"); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.05[B][2] (determining
that Rosette is not "the prevailing view under the 1909 Act").
206. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953 (quoting 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1992) § 4.05[B]).
207. Leeds Music Corp. v. Gusto Records, Inc., 601 F.2d 589, 589 (6th Cir. 1979).
208. Mayhew v. Gusto Records, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (M.D. Tenn. 1997); see also
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.05[B][2] (noting that "[t]he courts in applying the
1909 Act, were in most instances unpersuaded by the argument that no publication occurs by
virtue of the sale of a phonorecord because the record is not a 'copy' of the work recorded."). The
position that a phonorecord is a copy of the work recorded is implied in the cases listed supra
note 199 holding that the sale or distribution of a phonorecord constitutes publication of the
underlying work.
209. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953.
210. Id.
211. 143 CONG. REC. E1260-03 (June 19, 1997) (statement of Hon. Coble).
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For many years, the Copyright Office has espoused the view
that recordings sold before January 1, 1978 ...were not copies of the
musical compositions embodied on them, and therefore the
distribution of recordings did not constitute publication under the
federal copyright statute. Moreover, if by chance a recording bore an
appropriate copyright notice for the musical composition embodied on
it and registration for the music was sought on this basis, registration
was refused. The Office would state that copies had to be visually
perceptible, e.g. sheet music copies, and that unless such copies had
been sold, placed on sale or offered to the public, registration for the
212
music as a published work was not possible.
2 13
Likewise, the legislative history cites Rosette approvingly.
However, Congress never explicitly adopted Rosette's view that a
phonorecord is not a copy of the underlying musical composition. 2 14 In
1997, attempting to "restore the law to what it was before [La
Cienega], 2 15 Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 303(b), which provides that
"[t]he distribution before January 1, 1978, of a phonorecord shall not
for any purpose constitute a publication of the musical work embodied
2 16
therein."
Although section 303(b) greatly restricts many acts of
exploitation of a musical work from constituting publication of the
underlying composition, section 303(b) does not preclude that result in
all instances.
Section 303(b) prevents the distribution of a
phonorecord from constituting publication of the underlying musical
work. 217 Although Congress did not define "distribution" for purposes
of section 303(b), the legislative history suggests a broad
interpretation of the term. As mentioned earlier, Congress enacted

212. H.R. REP. No. 104-554, at 21 (1996) (testimony before Congress of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights).
213. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 105-325, at 2 (1997); 143 CONG. REC. S11541-03 (Oct. 31, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Hatch); 143 CONG. REC. E1260-03 (June 19, 1997) (statement of Hon. Coble);
143 CONG. REC. S2654-01 (Mar. 20, 1997) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
214. The legislative history indicates discussion of the view of Rosette and the Copyright
Office that "the release of a phonorecord was not a 'copy' for purposes of the Act." H.R. REP. No.
105-325, at 2 (1997); see also Jonathan C. Stewart & Daniel E. Wanat, Entertainment and
Copyright Law: Section 303 of the Copyright Act is Amended and a Pre-1978 Phonorecord
Distribution of a Musical Work Is Not a Divestitive Publication, 19 LOy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 23, 48
(1998) (quoting same). Nonetheless, Congress did not provide that "a phonorecord embodying a
musical composition is not a copy of that composition." Instead, Congress's primary rationale in
enacting section 303(b) appears to have been its concern that La Cienega "placed a cloud over the
legal status of a large number of works." See H.R. REP. No. 105-325, at 5 (1997) (discussing the
legal status of musical compositions under the 1909 Act).
215. H.R. REP. NO. 104-554, at 20 (1996).
216. 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2004).
217. Id.
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section 303(b) to overturn La Cienega and to "restore" the law to what
it was under Rosette.2 18
Both La Cienega and Rosette involved
whether the sale of a phonograph record constitutes publication - in
the words of one Senator, whether a composition is published
"immediately upon the first sale." 219 Thus, construing section 303(b)
as constrained to the facts of La Cienega leads to the conclusion that
"distribution" means simply "sale." Equating distribution and sale,
however, would not be faithful to Congressional intent because
Congresspersons repeatedly distinguished between the distribution
and sale of phonorecords. 220 Moreover, some Congressmen viewed the
sale of phonorecords simply as one type of distribution. 221 In addition,
had Congress intended to preclude only the sale of phonorecords from
constituting publication, it could have simply said so, instead of using
the term "distribution." Thus, a broad interpretation of "distribution"
to include virtually any exploitation of phonorecords is probably most
consistent with Congressional intent. Accordingly, courts have held
that the distribution of phonorecords encompasses the sale,222
distribution for sale, 223 distribution for radio play, 224 and distribution
225
for jukebox play.
On the other hand, the phrase "distribution of phonorecords"
does not encompass various other types of exploitations, including
distribution of sheet music, licensing a song for exploitation, radio

218. See supra text accompanying note 215.
219. La Cienega v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 1995), superceded by 17 U.S.C. § 303(b)
(2004); Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 546
F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirmed on basis of the district court's opinion); 143 CONG. REC. S2654
(Mar. 20, 1997) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
220. 143 CONG. REC. E1260-03 (June 19, 1997) (statement of Hon. Coble) (arguing that the
view of the Copyright Office and the music industry was that "the sale or distribution of
recordings to the public" did not constitute publication); 142 CONG. REC. H5781-01 (June 4, 1996)
(statement of Hon. Schroeder) (asserting that the view of the Copyright Office is "that the sale or
distribution of recordings to the public" does not constitute publication).
221. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S2654 (March 20, 1997) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes)
(concluding that "La Cienega held that distributing a sound recording to the public - for example
by sale - is a 'publication' of the music recorded on it"); 143 CONG. REC. S11301-01 (Oct. 28,
1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (determining that "La Cienega held that distributing a sound
recording to the public - by sale for example - is a publication of the music recorded on it"). On
the other hand, this is an imprecise characterization of La Cienega's holding, which was that
"selling recordings constitutes 'publication' under the Copyright Act of 1909." La Cienega, 53
F.3d at 953 (emphasis added). In fact, the only time the La Cienega court used the term
"distribution" occurred when it quoted NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10. Id.
222. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Lavere, 217 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2000).
223. Mayhew v. Allsup, 166 F.3d 821, 822 (6th Cir. 1999).
224. Id.
225. Id.
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play, or jukebox play. Section 303(b) is restricted to the distribution of
phonorecords. Congress defined "phonorecords" as:
[M]aterial objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term "phonorecords" includes the
226
material object in which the sounds are first fixed.

Sheet music obviously does not fit this definition.
One
definition of sheet music is "[c]ompositions printed on unbound sheets
of paper. '227 No sounds are fixed in sheet music because sheet music
is simply a written document. Thus, the term "distribution of
phonorecords" does not encompass the distribution of sheet music.
Accordingly, no controversy surrounds the notion that the distribution
of sheet music constitutes a publication of the underlying musical
228
composition.
Likewise, licensing a musical composition for exploitation does
not necessarily involve distributing phonorecords.
In general, a
license allows the licensee to exploit a work in exchange for a
royalty. 229
Licensing a musical composition generally involves
drafting a written document that specifies various items, including
"the manner in which the work may be exploited. ' 230 If, for example, a
licenser issues a license that allows the licensee the right only to
distribute sheet music, no phonorecord would be distributed pursuant
to the license.
Thus, to the extent that licensing a work for
exploitation does not involve the distribution of a phonorecord, section
303(b) does not encompass that exploitation.
Similarly, the term "phonorecord" does not encompass every
form of sound recording. 231 "Sound recordings" are not "material
objects" but, under the 1909 Act, are "works that result from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not
including the sounds accompanying a motion picture. '232 Thus, a
226. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
227. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1255 (3d ed. 1997).
228. See supra note 198.
229. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 931 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "compulsory license" as "[a]
statutorily created license that allows certain parties to use copyrighted material without the
explicit permission of the copyright owner in exchange for a specified royalty").
230. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW §§ 5.12-5.13[A] (3d ed. 1999).
231. On the other hand, Professor Landau apparently uses the terms "phonorecords" and
"sound recordings" interchangeably. See Landau, supra note 85, at 29-30 (equating "phonograph
records" and "sound recordings"). Equating phonorecords and sound recordings is incorrect, as
manifested by differing definitions of the two terms under section 101 of the 1976 Act. See also
text accompanying notes 231-236.
232. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1909). The 1976 Act similarly defines sound recordings as "works that
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the
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sound recording is the intangible fixation of sounds, while a
phonorecord is the tangible embodiment of one or more sound
recordings. 23 3 For example, a cassette tape is a phonorecord, but the
sounds fixed on that cassette tape are fixed in one or more sound
recordings. Moreover, selling a cassette tape involves the distribution
of a phonorecord and a sound recording. However, playing a song on
the radio or on a jukebox involves the dissemination of a sound
recording, not a phonorecord, because no "material object" is
distributed. Thus, in interpreting the current 1976 Copyright Act, the
Second Circuit concluded that "transmitting a sound recording to the
234
public on the airwaves" is not a distribution of a material object.
This interpretation also makes sense for the 1909 Act because a
person listening to a song on the radio does not have immediate
tangible access to the song but may convert the intangible sound
recording into a material object by, for instance, recording it onto a
cassette. Accordingly, in interpreting section 303(b), one district court
has held that playing a song on the radio constitutes publication of the
musical composition. 235 Because the exploitation of a sound recording
does not necessarily involve the distribution of a phonorecord, section
303(b) does not always preclude the exploitation of a sound recording
23 6
from constituting publication of the underlying work.
IV. THE NEW DEFINITION: AUTHORIZED EXPLOITATION OF A WORK BY
THE AUTHOR AND/OR OWNER

The dual policies of the 1909 Act, pertinent case law, and
scholarship all point to one appropriate definition of publication under
the 1909 Act: subject to the exceptions of limited publication,
performance, and distribution of phonorecords embodying musical
sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2004).

233. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 2.10[A] ("[A] sound recording copyright
may be claimed in the aggregate of sounds embodied in any tangible medium, including
phonograph discs. .. and other material objects in which sounds are fixed and can be
communicated either directly or with the aid of machine or device.").
234. Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 325 (2d Cir. 1995).
235. King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 18 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003).
236. Professor Landau argues to the contrary, asserting that "[a]s a result of... § 303(b) and
the interpretation in Mayhew ...[t]he release of a sound recording is not a 'publication' of the
underlying musical compositions." Landau, supra note 85, at 43. Professor Landau's analysis,
however, appears to be based on the incorrect assumption that "sound recordings" and
"phonorecords" are synonyms. See supra note 231. Landau's analysis does not take into account
section 303(b)'s use of the term "phonorecord," which is limited to material objects, as opposed to
"sound recording," which is not limited to material objects. See supra text accompanying notes
231-236.
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work, 237 publication is the exploitation of a work authorized by the
author and/or owner of the work. This definition, which is consistent
with the 1909 Act as written, was first proposed in a version tailored
to musical compositions in King Records, Inc. v. Daily.2 38 Although
the King Records court did not explicitly adopt this definition, the
court praised it as "consistent with the principles of general
publication." 239 This definition has four elements: (1) author and/or
owner, (2) authorization, (3) exploitation, and (4) work.
A. Author and/or Owner
This new definition recognizes that the author and owner
might not be the same person but that both have an "exclusive right"
to their work for "limited times" under the Constitution's Copyright
and Patent Clause. 240 Upon creation of the composition, the author
has the exclusive right to his own work for "limited times." 241 If, as is
common, however, the author sells his rights to the work to a third
party, the third party becomes the owner of the work and thereby
242
obtains the "exclusive right" for "limited times."
B. Authorization
Under the 1909 Act, the use of a work must be authorized
before it can be published. The concept of "authorization" is like the
notion of "consent" that Melville Nimmer employs in his definition of
publication 243 and recognizes the importance of the copyright owner's
intent under the 1909 Act. 244 As discussed above, the dual purposes of
the 1909 Act are to promote the reward of a limited monopoly to

237. For a discussion of these three exceptions, see supra Part III.B.
238. The plaintiffs proposed the definition that publication is "the exploitation of a musical
composition authorized by the author and/or owner of the musical composition." King Records,
Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 17 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003).
239. Id.
240. The U.S. Constitution refers to "securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to .... UU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8., cl. 8 (emphasis added). On the other hand,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, refers to the owner's copyright. See supra note 82
("publication occurs when by consent of the copyright owner .. ")(emphasis added).
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8., cl. 8.
242. See, e.g., NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 2.10[A][3] (discussing ownership of
sound recordings).
243. See supra text accompanying note 82 ("publication occurs when by consent of the
copyright owner ...").
244. See generally NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.04 (discussing unauthorized
exploitation of a work).
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authors and the free dissemination of ideas. 245 These policies would
be greatly undermined if the author and/or owner were unable to
control the use of his composition because the limited monopoly would
be worthless.
If an author were unable to control his work's
exploitation, he would be less inclined to produce it because, for
instance, potential purchasers would be discouraged from buying such
extremely limited rights. Consequently, the new definition restricts
publication only to exploitation that is authorized by the author and/or
owner.
C. Exploitation
A work's publication also requires its exploitation.
The
Supreme Court has repeatedly used the term "exploitation" to describe
an owner's utilization of his work. 2 46 Nimmer on Copyright has also
employed this term for similar purposes. 24 7 Black's Law Dictionary
defines exploitation as "the act or process of making use of."248 The
concept of exploitation is intrinsically linked with the 1909 Act's policy
of providing an incentive for authors to create works.
Thus,
exploitation means the use of a work for a purpose that provides an
incentive for an author to create a work. Generally, this incentive is
economic, such as royalty payments, but includes any other
motivation to generate the work like fame or bringing attention to a
particular cause (e.g., the civil rights movement).
Subject to the three exceptions discussed above, 2 49 exploitation
encompasses the many uses of works provided for in other definitions
of publication.
As in Melville Nimmer's definition, exploitation
includes situations where a work is "sold, leased, loaned, given away,
or otherwise made available to the general public, or when an
authorized offer is made to dispose of the work in any such manner
250
even if a sale or other such disposition does not in fact occur."
Exploitation also encompasses exhibiting or displaying a work "in
such a manner as to permit unrestricted copying by the general
public." 25 1 Similarly, a copyright owner would exploit a work upon
"the distribution and/or exhibition of the work for unlimited use,

245. See supratext accompanying notes 20-26.
246. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213, 219 (2003).
247. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08[B].

248.
249.
250.
251.
1999).

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (5th ed. 1979).
See supraPart III.B.
Nimmer, supra note 74, at 187; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.04.
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir.
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enjoyment, or copying by the general public." 252 Thus, the term
"exploitation" draws no distinction between tangible and intangible
exploitations of a work and, accordingly, encompasses the playing of a
previously made studio recording on the radio253 and the public
254
display of a painting or sculpture.
On the other hand, common law and statutory developments
prevent three types of exploitation from constituting publication.
First, exploitations of a work constituting only a limited publication
would not be requisite acts of exploitation to constitute a general
publication. 255 As discussed earlier, a limited publication would occur,
for instance, "if an author distributes copies of his work to a circle of
immediate friends with the express or implied understanding that
such copies will not be duplicated or circulated. ... ,"256
Second, in accordance with applicable case law and the dual
policies of the 1909 Act, exploitation does not encompass live
performances or situations where practical considerations warrant a
broader interpretation of the term "performance."257 Accordingly, the
"oral dissemination" of a musical, literary, or dramatic work
constitutes performance, 258 whereas radio play of a previously made
2 59
studio recording would constitute publication.
Third, exploitation does not include the distribution of musical
compositions embodied on phonorecords because 17 U.S.C. § 303(b)
provides that "[t]he distribution before January 1, 1978, of a
phonorecord shall not for any purpose constitute a publication of the
musical work embodied therein. '260 Pursuant to this Note's earlier
analysis, section 303(b) precludes publication from occurring upon the
following exploitations of phonorecords: sale, distribution for sale,
26 1
distribution for radio play, and distribution for jukebox play.
Section 303(b) does not encompass radio play or jukebox play,

252. King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 17 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003).
253. See id. at 18 (holding that radio play of a musical composition constitutes publication);
see also Mayhew v. Allsup, No. 3:96-1081, slip op. at 14 (M.D. Tenn. July 24, 2001) (determining
that "[p]laying a song on the radio, so long as it is not merely a performance, would constitute
publication' ").

254. Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 320 F. Supp. 1303,
1311 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
255. See analysis of limited publication supra notes 143-152.
256. See supra note 151.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 157-195.
258. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.08.
259. See supra note 253.
260. 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2004).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 196-236.
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however, because these types of exploitations do not involve the
262
distribution of a phonorecord.
D. Work
As used in this Note's definition, the term "work" encompasses
the original and any tangible or intangible 2 63 embodiments of the
work. Exploitation of the original could, for example, involve the
display of a sculpture, the sale of a painting, or the licensing of a
musical composition. Moreover, requisite embodiments of a work
include, for instance, sheet music, phonorecords, sound recordings, a
script of a speech, an audio or video recording of a speech, film prints,
and photographs of a sculpture or painting.
The benefits of including intangible embodiments within the
meaning of the term "work" can be illustrated in the context of
musical compositions.
Preventing the exploitation of a sound
recording, an intangible embodiment of a work, from constituting
publication of the underlying work would guarantee many authors an
extended monopoly in their musical compositions. This result occurs
because authors or copyright owners never transcribed many, if not
most, compositions to sheet music. 264 Under the 1909 Act as originally
enacted, an artist who wrote a song and complied immediately with
the statutory requirements received twenty-eight years of copyright
protection plus a renewal term of twenty-eight years from the time of
publication with notice. 265 But, if exploitation of a sound recording
does not constitute publication, an artist who did not, immediately
comply could have repeatedly performed the song, sold multitudes of
records, and received extensive radio play of the song, while relying on
common law copyright protection before complying with the statutory
formalities. 266 "From that late point of compliance on, the statutory
262. An argument that radio play is merely incidental to the distribution of a phonorecord is
not persuasive. After all, the radio play itself, not the presence of a phonorecord at a radio
station, generates the revenue for the copyright owner. See supra note 105 (describing royalties
generated from radio play).
263. The position that the exploitation of an intangible embodiment of a work constitutes
publication has various adherents. See supra note 85.
264. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.05[B] [4]:
When the 1909 Act was adopted, the sale of sheet music constituted the major source
of revenue. Today such sales are minimal, and the significant aspect of the business
lies in the sale of phonorecords (as well as in performance fees). For this reason, it is
a common practice to market records of a musical work without publishing the work
in sheet music form.
265. See supra note 29.
266. See La Cienega v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 1995), superceded by 17 U.S.C. §
303(b) (2004) ("[U]nder Rosette, an artist who does not so comply can sell any number of
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copyright owner receive[d] [the statutorily provided term] of federal
protection."' 267 This result encouraged artists "to delay compliance
with the Copyright Act's requirements and thereby receive 'longer'
copyright protection" than those who complied promptly. 268 Moreover,
in the event that the owner chose to seek damages through federal
copyright law, he could have done so, even if the infringement
occurred prior to his obtaining of a federal copyright. 269 Thus,
including intangible embodiments within the term "work" adheres to
the Congressional balance between the 1909 Act's dual policies and
prevents the judicial overreaching of extending the copyright term
beyond the statutorily mandated period.
V. APPLICATION OF THE NEW DEFINITION TO KEY CASES

Applying this new definition to the facts of notable cases
demonstrates that it effectively serves the dual purposes of the 1909
Act, while avoiding the shortcomings of other leading definitions.
A. Music
1. ABKCO & La Cienega: Sale & Distribution for Sale
Both before and after Congress's enactment of 17 U.S.C. §
303(b) in 1997, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the sale or
distribution of a phonorecord constitutes publication of the underlying
musical composition. In its 1995 decision in La Cienega Music Co. v.
ZZ Top, the Ninth Circuit held that the sale of a phonorecord
constitutes publication. 270 La Cienega Music Co. ("La Cienega") sued
the musical group ZZ Top and others, claiming that ZZ Top's song "La
Grange" infringed on its copyright of blues great John Lee Hooker's
"Boogie Chillen." 271 Both "Boogie Chillen" and "La Grange" have
enjoyed enormous popularity. Between 1948 and 1970, John Lee
Hooker wrote and recorded various versions of "Boogie Chillen," one of
which sold up to one million copies. 2 72 "La Grange" was released in

recordings for several years, receiving common law copyright protection all the while, before
copyrighting the work with the Copyright Office.").
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 113-114.
270. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953.
271. Id. at 952.
272. Id.
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1973 and is ZZ Top's "signature song." 273 It."has had global circulation
as a phonorecord, has been recorded by other prominent artists, has
been prominently featured in a national television advertising
campaign, and has been performed at thousands of ZZ Top
27 4
concerts."
ZZ Top argued that, even if "La Grange" plagiarized "Boogie
Chillen," La Cienega was not entitled to damages because "Boogie
Chillen" had been injected into the public domain when federal
statutory requirements were not followed and the song had been
distributed for sale and had been sold. 275 The Ninth Circuit agreed 2in
76
part, holding that the sale of a phonorecord constitutes publication.
It remanded the case regarding the issue of compliance with federal
277
statutory requirements, however.
Five years later, in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Lavere, the Ninth
Circuit addressed a similar issue. 278 ABKCO Music, Inc. ("ABKCO")
owned the copyrights to two Rolling Stones songs-"Love in Vain,"
released in 1969, and "Stop Breakin' Down," released in 1972.279 Both
songs were featured on hugely successful albums, both of which
ROLLING STONE MAGAZINE ranked among the "greatest albums of all
time." 2 0 These songs were adapted versions of songs by the same
28 1
titles written by Robert Johnson, a prominent blues artist.
Johnson's versions of the songs had been released on phonorecords
and distributed in the late 1930s. 28 2 No copyright registration for
Johnson's songs was ever filed.28 3 In response to the threat of a
lawsuit by the alleged owners of the Johnson songs, ABKCO sought a
declaratory judgment that the two Johnson compositions were in the
28 4
public domain.

273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 953-54.
276. Id. at 953.
277. Id. at 954.
278. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Lavere, 217 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000).
279. Id. at 685.
280. Rolling Stone magazine ranked Exile on Main Street, the album that features "Stop
Breakin' Down," as the seventh greatest album of all time. The 500 GreatestAlbums of All Time,
ROLLING STONE, Dec. 11, 2003, at 90. Likewise, Let it Bleed, the album that contains "Love in
Vain," is listed as the thirty-second greatest album of all time. Id. at 106.
281. ABKCO Music, Inc., 217 F.3d at 685-87.
282. Id. at 685.
283. Id. at 687.
284. Id.
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The ABKCO court held that the distribution of phonorecords
embodying Johnson's songs did not constitute publication.2 8 5 It
reasoned that Congress effectively overruled La Cienega in 1997 by
providing that "[t]he distribution before January 1, 1978, of a
phonorecord shall not for any purpose constitute a publication of the
musical work embodied therein." 28 6 Thus, the ABKCO court concluded
that "distribution" under section 303(b) encompassed the distribution
for sale of phonorecords embodying Johnson's songs. 28 7
Under this Note's definition, the result in ABKCO, but not in
La Cienega, would have been the same. The authorized sale or
distribution of phonorecords constitutes an authorized exploitation of
the musical compositions at issue. The sale and distribution of
phonorecords, however, fall within the exception carved out by
Congress in section 303(b) for the distribution of phonorecords. Thus,
the authorized sale or distribution of phonorecords embodying a
musical composition would not constitute publication under this
Note's definition.
2. King Records: Licensing, Distribution for Radio Play & Radio Play
In King Records, Inc. v. Daily, the plaintiffs, two record
companies, (collectively "King Records") entered agreements in 1984
and 1995 with one of the defendants, a music publisher, (hereinafter
"Daily") to exploit three songs written by George Jones. 28 8 At that
time, King Records believed that Daily owned the compositions and
was therefore entitled to license them for royalties. 28 9 One of the
record companies paid Daily royalties for almost twenty years for the
right to exploit the songs, while the other paid for that right for about
eight years. 290 King Records later sued Daily to reclaim those royalty
payments, claiming that Daily did not own the songs because the
songs had been forfeited to the public domain through publication
without compliance with the 1909 Act's requirements. 291
In the mid-to-late 1950s, Daily licensed the three songs to
record companies for commercial exploitation. 292 Also during that
time, Daily "allowed recorded performances of the songs to be played
285. Id. at 692.
286. Id. at 690 (determining that section 303(b) "is intended to restore the law to what it was
before [La Cienega]"); 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2004).
287. ABKCO Music, Inc., 217 F.3d at 690-92.
288. King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 23.
291. Id. at 2, 22.
292. Id. at 18.
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on the radio to a broad audience, without limitation, for which it
received royalties." 293 Additionally, one of the songs was performed
and recorded by musicians of the licensed record companies, received
regular airplay so that it remained on the Billboard charts for twelve
weeks, and generated royalties for Daily. 294 Roughly twenty years
later, in 1979, Daily deposited copies of the songs with the U.S.
295
Copyright Office.
The King Records court held that the songs had been
published. 296
The court was unsure "whether distributing
phonorecords would encompass a situation where the owner of a
copyrighted work licenses the work to record companies for
exploitation. ' 29 7 It concluded, however, that allowing "the songs to be
played on the radio to a broad audience, without limitation, for which
it received royalties" constituted publication. 298 Addressing Daily's
subsequent motion to alter or amend, the King Records court affirmed
its prior ruling as effectuating "the public interest in protecting
299
copyrights."
Under this Note's definition of publication, the result would
have been the same but for slightly different reasons. King Records
involved three acts of authorized exploitation of the composition:
issuing licenses to record companies to exploit the work, distributing
the sound recordings to radio stations, and playing at least one song
on the radio. 30 0 The key question then is whether the exceptions for
limited publication, performance or distribution of phonorecords
encompass any of these acts of exploitation. Issuing a license to a
record company would have constituted the requisite exploitation, so
long as it involved a distinct act of exploitation apart from the
distribution of a phonorecord. 3 1 Moreover, licensing the work for
exploitation would not have constituted a limited publication because
there is no evidence that Daily limited to a select group those who

293. Id.
294. Id. at 7-8.
295. Id. at 21.
296. Id. at 18.
297. Id. at 18 n.12.
298. Id. at 18.
299. King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Tenn. July 9, 2004).
300. King Records proved that the George Jones song Accidentally on Purpose had been
played on the radio. King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 8, 18 (M.D. Tenn.
Sept. 22, 2003).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 228-231.

898

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:857

could have negotiated to become licensees. 30 2 Thus, Daily's issuance of
a license for the purpose of exploiting a musical composition would
have constituted publication.
On the other hand, Daily's allowance of sound recordings to be
distributed to radio stations would not have constituted publication.
Since section 303(b) provides that the distribution of phonorecords
"shall not for any purpose constitute a publication of the musical work
embodied therein,"30 3 and Congress appears to construe the term
"distribution" broadly, 30 4 section 303(b) probably encompasses the
distribution of phonorecords for the purpose of playing the songs on
the radio.
Radio play of each song at issue would have constituted
publication under my definition, however, because each was a
previously made studio recording. Section 303(b) does not encompass
playing a song on the radio. As discussed above, radio play is not a
form of distribution of a phonorecord because broadcasting a song does
not involve the distribution of a material object. 30 5 Likewise, radio
play of a previously made studio recording does not constitute mere
performance because compliance with statutory formalities before
broadcast is not particularly burdensome. 3 6 After all, no special
burden in complying with the statutory formalities accompanies radio
play of a previously recorded track.
In sum, the songs in King Records were published to the extent
that they had been played on the radio or had been licensed for
exploitation in a way that did not involve simply the distribution of
phonorecords. However, those that were only distributed for radio
play but not actually played on the radio would not have been
published. This result is consistent with the dual purposes of the 1909
Act. As manifested by King Record's payment of royalties to Daily,
Daily's exploitation of the songs generated economic benefits of the
type envisioned by the 1909 Act. Moreover, a contrary outcome would
have provided a disincentive to comply with the 1909 Act's formalities
because Daily could have obtained a much longer monopoly by
delaying compliance. 307 Furthermore, this result prevents the
302. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.13 n.16 ("Unless the stations that might
engage in such negotiations were limited in some manner, it would seem that there was no
limitation as to persons.").
303. 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2004).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 217-225.
305. See supra text accompanying notes at 231-236.
306. For a discussion of situations where compliance with statutory formalities is or is not
particularly burdensome, see supra text accompanying notes 182-185.
307. For example, the song Accidentally on Purpose received radio play in 1960. King
Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 8 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003). Had the song
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overreaching that results from a judicially-generated twenty-plus-year
308
extension on the limited monopoly.
3. Mayhew: Jukeboxes
In Mayhew v. Allsup, the Sixth Circuit held that a musical
composition was not published when a "recording was offered for sale,
placed in jukeboxes, and distributed for radio airplay."30 9
As
previously discussed, distribution of phonorecords under section
303(b) encompasses the offering for sale and distribution for radio
airplay of phonorecords. Likewise, placing recordings in jukeboxes
would be another form of distribution of phonorecords.
A question not addressed in Mayhew is whether the jukebox
play of a recording constitutes publication. Jukebox play constitutes
publication because it is an authorized exploitation of the work that
does not fall within the exceptions to publication. Because it is
exploitation of a musical composition that generates economic benefits
to the copyright owner, 3 10 it is the type of exploitation that should
amount to publication of the work. It does not involve the distribution
311
of phonorecords because no "material" object is distributed.
Similarly, the jukebox play at issue does not involve a limited
publication because there is no evidence that the copyright owner
3 12
restricted to a "select group" the parties who could play the songs.

obtained a federal copyright in 1960, under current law, the copyright would expire in 2055. See
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2004) (extending copyright for ninety-five years from date of publication for
works in their first copyright term on January 1, 1978). On the other hand, if the exploitation in
1960 did not constitute publication, Daily's common law copyright in the song would have
converted into a federal copyright in 1978. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (providing for conversion of
common law copyright into federal copyright for works created but not published or copyrighted
prior to 1978). The federal copyright would then last during the life of the author plus seventy
years. 17 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 302(a) (2004). In this scenario (which Daily advocated), the federal
copyright would expire no earlier than 2075 because George Jones, the author of Accidentally on
Purpose, is still living as of the time of this Note's writing. See Nationmaster.com, Encyclopedia:
George Jones, at http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/George-Jones (last visited Sept. 15,
2004) ("George Jones continues to make albums and play to his loyal fans."). In the event that
Mr. Jones, who was born in 1931, lives to be ninety-years-old, the copyright would extend until
2091. See id. (providing date of birth of Mr. Jones). In the latter situation, by delaying
compliance with statutory formalities until 1979, Daily would receive a copyright term that lasts
thirty-six years longer than it would had Daily complied in 1960. See King Records, Inc. v. Daily,
No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 21 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003) (noting that Daily complied with
statutory formalities in 1979).
308. See supra note 307.
309. Mayhew v. Allsup, 166 F.3d 821, 822 (6th Cir. 1999).
310. See supratext accompanying note 190.
311. See supratext accompanying notes 231-236.
312. See supratext accompanying notes 146-152.
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Likewise, the performance exception does not apply because
complying with statutory formalities presents no special burden with
a work embodied in a studio recording. 313 Although jukebox play does
not permit as wide a dissemination of a song as radio play does, what
matters is not the number of people who gain access to the work but
the availability of copies of the work to interested members of the
public. 3 14 In addition, even courts that import judicial interpretation
of "public performance for profit" from section 1 into the performance
exception to publication would have great difficulty equating jukebox
play with performance. 3 15 One reason is that the 1909 Act explicitly
precludes jukebox play from constituting a performance under section
1 in many, if not most, instances: "The reproduction or rendition of a
musical composition by or upon coin-operated machines shall not be
deemed a public performance for profit unless a fee is charged for
316
admission to the place where such reproduction or rendition occurs."
Another reason is that not all transmissions on the radio or
television were deemed public performances for profit under section
1.317 To reach this conclusion, courts developed a distinction between
broadcasters and viewers, whereby broadcasters perform but viewers
do not. 318 Broadcasters select the programs to be viewed or to be
319
listened to, "procure programs and propagate them to the public."
On the other hand, a listener or viewer is "[o]ne who manually or by
human agency merely actuates electrical instrumentalities, whereby
inaudible elements that are omnipresent in the air are made audible
to persons who are within hearing, [and] does not 'perform' within the
meaning of the Copyright Law." 320 It would be difficult to argue that a
person who presses play on a jukebox does anything other than
"merely actuate electrical instrumentalities." In fact, it is difficult to
imagine a more passive actor in the transmission of a song on a
jukebox than a person who simply presses play. Thus, because

313. See supra text accompanying notes 182-185.
314. Nimmer, supra note 74, at 187.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 173-181.
316. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909).
317. For example, in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., the Supreme Court
held that the transmission of distant signals did not constitute a "performance" within the
meaning of the 1909 Act. 415 U.S. 394, 403-405 (1974); see also Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1968) (holding that CATV systems do not perform
the programs they receive and carry); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
162-64 (1975) (holding that a restaurant owner who played the radio for his customers did not
perform songs broadcast on the radio).
318. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 398.
319. Id. at 400.
320. Id. at 399 n.24 (quoting Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929)).
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jukebox play involves listening, as opposed to broadcasting, even
under the meaning of "public performance for profit" under section 1,
jukebox play should constitute publication, not performance.
B. Film: Star Trek
In the late 1960s, Paramount Pictures Corp. and its
predecessor, Desilu Productions, Inc. (collectively "Paramount"),
produced the "Star Trek" television series. 321 Over time, the series
became enormously popular. It has been re-run by many television
stations and has generated full-length feature films, animated
cartoons, toys, books, and other accessories. 322 Between 1969 and
1979, Paramount executed two types of licensing agreements with
various stations for the broadcasting of the series. 323 Under the first,
a library license, the television stations acquired all seventy-nine of
the "Star Trek" episodes for the term of the license.3 24 At the end of
the term, the license required the stations to return the prints to
Paramount. 325 The second type of license, a booking license, provided
television stations with the episodes on a one-by-one basis and
326
required their return within forty-eight hours of their broadcast.
The two types of licenses provided essentially the same restrictions
upon the licensee. 327 The licensee could only broadcast the episodes to
non-paying audiences, could not relinquish possession of the prints,
could not allow copies of the prints to be made, and had to comply with
the aforementioned restrictions on the delivery and return of the
prints. 328 The "Star Trek" series was broadcast on various television
stations across the country pursuant to these licenses. 329 Paramount,
however, did not obtain a valid copyright notice prior to the broadcast
on these stations. 330
After a video company engaged in the
unauthorized sale of "Star Trek" videocassettes, Paramount sued the
company for copyright infringement and related violations. 3 31 The
video company countered that Paramount's syndication of the series
321. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Rubinowitz, No. CV 81-0925, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17553, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 1981).
322. Id. at **2-3.
323. Id. at *10.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at ** 2, 10-11.
330. Id. at **3-4.
331. Id. at *1.
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without compliance with the statutory requirements dedicated the
332
works to the public domain.
In Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Rubinowitz, the district court
held that Paramount's syndication of the series did not constitute
publication. 333 The court reasoned that "Paramount's explicit and
exhaustive reservation of rights" in its licensing agreements prevented
the syndication from constituting publication. 334 Instead, the court
held that the distribution of prints to television stations was a limited
publication because Paramount "reserved its rights in each contract as
to the number of persons who would have access to the series and the
' 335
use they could make of it.
Under this Note's definition, each of Paramount's three types of
authorized exploitation of the films would have constituted
publication. First, the licensing of the film prints allowed Paramount
to generate revenue from the exploitation of the films and, thus, would
have constituted publication. As the Rubinowitz court determined, a
key question is whether the restrictions placed on the licensees limited
the exploitation to a limited publication. 336 The answer should be "no"
because Paramount did not limit to a select group the pool of licensees.
337 Instead, apparently any interested party could have negotiated to
338
become a licensee.
Second, the distribution of film prints to various television
stations also was a form of exploitation that was a central component
of Paramount's ability to make money on the transactions. The
general rule for the distribution of film prints to television stations is
that "[t]he mere fact that only a selected group evinced interest in
obtaining copies will not render the publication limited."33 9 Thus, for
example, "placing the film prints in regional distribution offices for
rental to anyone" would constitute a general publication. 340
Rubinowitz attempts to distinguish this general rule by holding that
Paramount's direct negotiations with individual television stations
332. Id. at *3.
333. Id. at *12.
334. Id. at *11.

335. Id. at *12.
336. Id. at **8-12.
337. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.13 n.13.1 ("Unless the stations that
might engage in such negotiations were limited in some manner, it would seem that there was no
limitation as to persons.").
338. Id. at § 4.13.
339. See id. ("The mere fact that only a selected group evinced interest in obtaining copies
will not render the publication limited.").
340. ParamountPictures Corp., 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17553, at *12 (quoting NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.11[B], 4-55 (1978)).
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constituted the requisite limitation on the persons who obtained
licenses of the works. 341 However, Nimmer on Copyright has criticized
this distinction as "questionable" because "[u]nless the stations that
might engage in such negotiations were limited in some manner, it
would seem that there was no limitation as to persons."3 42 Thus,
because the parties who could be involved in the negotiations were not
limited to a "select group," the licenses failed to restrict the
exploitation from constituting a general publication.
Third, the authorized broadcasting of the series on television
constituted publication as a revenue-generating exploitation of the
34 3
Although some courts have held to the contrary,
works.
broadcasting the series should not be deemed a performance because,
like previously recorded phonorecords and unlike the live performance
of a play, there is no special burden in complying with the statutory
344
formalities.
The result that the films should have been published has
several policy benefits. It is consistent with the Congressional balance
between the dual policies of the 1909 Act by linking publication to the
author and/or owner's economic reward.
Moreover, it promotes
compliance with the 1909 Act's formalities by providing a disincentive
to delay compliance while a copyright owner continues to generate
revenue from the work's exploitation.
Furthermore, this result
preempts the possibility of judicially extending the limited monopoly
345
period by delaying the commencement of the copyright term.
C. Sculpture: The ChicagoPicasso
In the mid-1960s, Pablo Picasso agreed to create a sculpture for
the City of Chicago entitled "The Chicago Picasso." 346 In 1965, Picasso
completed the maquette (model) of the sculpture. 347 One year later,
341. Id.
342. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.13 n.13.1.

343. See supra text accompanying notes 168-171.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 182-185
345. It is not clear how much of an extension on the limited monopoly that Paramount
gained because the Paramount Pictures Corp. decision does not indicate whether Paramount
later complied with the statutory requirements.
If Paramount complied prior to 1978,
Paramount would have gained an extension lasting the number of years of delayed compliance.
See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2004) (measuring the duration of certain pre-1978 copyrights from the
date of publication). If, instead, Paramount did not comply, and its common law copyright
converted into a federal copyright, the federal copyright would last at least until 2047 if
Paramount published the work prior to January 1, 2003. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2004).
346. Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 320 F. Supp. 1303,
1305 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
347. Id.
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the City of Chicago mounted a public relations campaign to publicize
the sculpture. 348 As part of the campaign, the City allowed any person
to copy the maquette for any purpose, to obtain a camera permit for
49
photographing the work, and to obtain photos of it upon request.
Additionally, the City authorized the press to photograph the
maquette and to publish these photographs in widely read newspapers
and magazines. 350 In 1967, the sculpture was dedicated, and a
photograph of it was published in a report of the Chicago Art Institute
with a circulation of 40,000 copies. 351 Several months later, the City
applied for statutory copyright protection for the work.3 52 A publisher
who wanted to market a copy of the sculpture sought a declaratory
judgment to determine whether the work had been published prior to
353
the City's compliance with the 1909 Act's notice requirement.
In Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Building
Commission of Chicago, the district court held that the display of the
maquette constituted publication. 354 The Letter Edged in Black Press,
Inc. court distinguished American Tobacco Company v. Werckmeister
where, in 1907, the Supreme Court held that the display of a painting
in a gallery was a limited publication when making copies of the work
355
was prohibited and guards were stationed to enforce the prohibition.
The Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. court relied on dicta from
American Tobacco Company that "[w]e do not mean to say that the
public exhibition of a painting or statute, where all might see and
freely copy it, might not amount to publication within the statute,
regardless of the artist's purpose or notice of reservation of rights
which he takes no measure to protect." 356 In reference to the City's
acts of exploitation, the Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. court
reasoned that "[w]ere this activity classified as limited publication,
there would no longer be any meaningful distinction between limited

348. Id. at 1306.
349. Id. at 1306-07, 1311.
350. Id. at 1306, 1311.
351. Id. at 1306-07.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1305.
354. Id. at 1311. The court rejected the argument that the work of art that was copyrighted
was the sculpture, not the maquette, concluding that the maquette was the original work that
qualified for statutory copyright protection. Id. at 1310. It determined that "[w]hen the
monumental sculpture was finally completed it could not be copyrighted for it was a mere copy,
albeit on a grand scale, of the maquette, a work already in the public domain." Id.
355. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 300 (1907).
356. Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc., 320 F. Supp. at 1310-11 (quoting Am. Tobacco Co., 207
U.S. at 300).
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and general publication. 3 57 It concluded that its decision was
consistent with the 1909 Act's "policy of enriching society" through the
"broadest and most uninhibited reproduction and copying of a
provocative piece of public sculpture. 3 58
Under this Note's definition, the result would have been the
same on three grounds. First, the unrestricted distribution to the
public of photographs of the maquette and sculpture constitutes
publication as authorized acts of exploitation of the work. 35 9 On the
other hand, had the City distributed photographs of the work only to
the press for purposes of news coverage, the distribution would have
been a limited publication. 360 Second, the circulation of the Chicago
Art Institute's report containing a photograph of the sculpture
constitutes publication. The press's printing of photographs of the
36 1
sculpture, however, would have constituted a limited publication.
Third, the public display of the work for unrestricted copying and
photographing was also an authorized act of exploitation that
constituted publication.3 62 Unlike American Tobacco, there was no
express limitation on copying the maquette that would have restricted
the exploitation to a limited publication.3 63 In addition, the City's
public display does not fall within the performance exception because
complying with the statutory formalities presented no special burden.
Unlike the "I Have a Dream" speech where Dr. King would have been
forced to choose between press coverage and a copyright had there not
been the performance exception to the general rule of publication, the
City of Chicago itself generated the press coverage of the work
through its massive public relations campaign.
This result furthers the dual policies of the 1909 Act because
the City's acts of exploitation were intended to generate interest in the
sculpture, presumably, to attract attention to Chicago and generate
tourism revenues to the City. 364 Moreover, if the Letter Edged in
Black Press, Inc. court had concluded that the Chicago Picasso had not

357. Id. at 1311.
358. Id. at 1313.
359. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.09 n.7.
360. See infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
361. Id.
362. Nimmer concluded that the court's ruling that the public exhibition of the statute
constituted publication could be regarded as dicta because of the aforementioned unrestricted
distribution of photographs of the work without a copyright notice. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 10, § 4.09 n.7.
363. Letter Edged in Black Press,Inc., 320 F. Supp. at 1311.
364. Id. at 1306.
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been published, the City would have gained roughly a one-and-a-half
365
year extension on its copyright term.
D. Placing Copies in Public Files
In Fader v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, the
owners (collectively "Fader") of the common law copyright in the
motion picture "My Hero" filed the script with the U.S. Copyright
Office in 1950, but the resulting certificate of registration was invalid
so that Fader did not obtain a valid federal copyright. 366 Fader later
sued Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation ("Fox") for copyright
infringement after Fox allegedly copied the plot in Fox's movie entitled
"The Lieutenant Wore Skirts."3 67 Fox claimed that the filing of the
manuscript with the Copyright Office constituted publication, thereby
forfeiting Fader's ownership interest in the work. 368 The district court
held that the deposit of the manuscript did not constitute publication
even though the copyright registration certificate issued upon the
deposit was invalid. 369 The court reasoned that "Congress has not
provided that one who seeks to obtain the benefits of statutory
protection must surrender his common law copyright if statutory
370
protection is not afforded him."
Under this Note's definition of publication, the result would be
the same as the above decision, even though depositing a copy of the
work in the Copyright Office is literally an authorized exploitation of
the work. The rationale is that depositing a copy in public files was
not a use that provided an incentive for the author to create the work.
Under the 1909 Act, depositing a copy did not, for example, generate
monetary benefits for the author but, instead, was merely a condition
precedent to obtaining the full benefits of statutory copyright
protection.3 7 1 It would be inconsistent with the dual policies of the
1909 Act to conclude that publication occurred where there was no act
of exploitation that provided an incentive for the author to create the
work.

365. The City began exploiting the work in late 1966 and filed an application for copyright
registration in early 1968. Id. at 1306-07.
366. Fader v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 169 F. Supp. 880, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 881-82.
370. Id. at 882.
371. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 4.10 (discussing requirement of depositing
a copy of an unpublished work).
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E. Speech: Dr. King's PerformancePlus
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. gave his famous "I Have a Dream"
speech on August 28, 1963.372 He spoke in front of hundreds of
thousands of people and received massive coverage in newspapers and
on the radio and television, thereby allowing millions of others to view
and listen to the speech.3 7 3 About one month later, on September 30,
1963, Dr. King applied for statutory copyright protection for the
speech.3 7 4 In 1994, CBS broadcasted a documentary on the civil rights
movement with a segment entitled "Martin Luther King, Jr. and The
March on Washington."3 75 The segment contained material that CBS
had filmed during the March, including substantial footage of the
speech. 376 However, CBS did not request permission from Dr. King's
3 77
estate for its use, nor did CBS pay royalties to the estate for its use.
Dr. King's estate subsequently sued
CBS for
copyright
378
infringement.
The district court granted CBS' motion for summary judgment,
holding that Dr. King's "performance coupled with such wide and
unlimited reproduction and dissemination" in 1963 constituted
publication, thereby placing the speech in the public domain before
9
Dr. King complied with the statutory requirements for protection3
The district court considered the following factors to be crucial to its
decision:
(1) the March organizers were aware of and encouraged the press' coverage of the
March, (2) the studied effort by March organizers to secure as wide dissemination of the
March's speeches as possible, (3) dissemination of the speakers' words to the greatest
public audience possible was one goal of the March organizers, (4) the press was invited
to attend and to film the day's events, (5) the March was broadcast live on multiple
television networks and radio stations, and portions, including Dr. King's speech, were
subsequently re-broadcast, (6) at no point was the press given express limitations
regarding who could film the event or the extent to which their footage could be used, (7)
there is no indication that any such limitations were made or implied, and (8) there is no

372. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir.
1999).
373. Id.
374. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr,, Inc., v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354 (N.D.
Ga. 1998); Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1214.
375. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1213.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1354.

908

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:857

record of objections by Dr. King
or by other March participants or organizers as to the
380
press' coverage of the event.

In a two-to-one decision, the Eleventh Circuit reversed on two
primary grounds. 38 1 First, it concluded that a performance does not
constitute a general publication, regardless of the size of the
audience. 382 Second, it held that distribution to the news media "for
the purpose of enabling the reporting of a contemporary newsworthy
event" constituted merely a limited publication. 3 83
The court
remanded the case, however, due to factual disputes regarding (1)
whether an advance text of the speech was available in the press tent
on the day of the speech, and (2) whether Dr. King authorized the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference ("SCLC") to reprint the
entire text of the speech in the organization's newsletter in September
1963.384 In a concurring opinion, Judge Cook concluded that none of
the factors that the district court found determinative are relevant to
the issue of publication in the context of performed works "in the
absence of an authorized dissemination of a tangible copy of the work
without a copyright notice. '385 Judge Roney dissented on the basis of
38 6
the district court opinion.
Under this Note's definition, the result is the same as the 11th
Circuit's decision. There are four types of exploitations of the speech
at issue. First, Dr. King delivered the speech.3 8 7 Dr. King's live
delivery is a classic example of the need for the performance exception
to the doctrine of publication.
It would have been incredibly
burdensome for him to have been forced to deposit copies of the speech
prior to his performance. 388 Moreover, the size of the audience is not
389
relevant to the issue of performance.
Second, Dr. King authorized its rebroadcast on television and
radio stations and its reprinting in newspapers. 390
This type of
380. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1224 (Cook, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1352-53
(providing above quoted factors).
381. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1220.
382. Id. at 1217.
383. Id. at 1216.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 1221 (Cook, J., concurring).
386. Id. at 1227 (Roney, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 1213.
388. Dr. King finished writing the speech at 4:00 a.m. on the morning of the day he delivered
it. King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
389. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1352 (N.D. Ga.
1998), rev'd, 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999).
390. There is some question as to whether Dr. King approved the press's extensive coverage
of the speech. On the one hand, March organizers actively encouraged widespread press
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exploitation constitutes a limited publication because "distribution to
the news media, as opposed to the general public, for the purpose of
enabling the reporting of a contemporary newsworthy event, is only a
limited publication." 39 1 This rule makes sense because, in allowing
media coverage of his event, Dr. King limited the speech's rebroadcast
to the "select group" of the media for the "limited purpose" of providing
news coverage of his speech.3 92 Moreover, such a result "does not force
an author whose message happens to be newsworthy to choose
between obtaining news coverage for his work and preserving his
common-law copyright. '393 Furthermore, under the performance
exception, the media's broadcasting of the speech is clearly
distinguishable from the radio play of a studio recording or the
television broadcast of a film previously recorded on a set. Although
both involve the dissemination of an intangible embodiment of the
work, there is a much greater burden in depositing copies of a work
performed live than in depositing copies of a work embodied in a
previously made studio recording. 394
Moreover, the media's rebroadcasting of Dr. King's live delivery is also distinguishable from a
previously made studio recording because Dr. King would have carried
the same burden for complying with the statutory formalities whether
the press broadcast the speech live or waited a short time before
broadcasting its recording of the live address.
Third, Dr. King may have authorized an advance text of the
speech to be made available in the press tent on the day of the
speech. 395 Assuming that Dr. King authorized the text's availability,
this form of exploitation would have constituted a limited publication
if the intended recipients were only members of the press whose use of
the text was limited to covering the speech.3 96 If Dr. King intended for
the members of the public also to have access to the text, however, the
distribution of the text would have constituted a general publication.
Although injection in the public domain would be especially harsh in
this situation, Dr. King could have avoided this result by simply
restricting the text's dissemination to the press for news coverage
coverage of the event, and, according to the Georgia district court's findings, "there is no record of
objections by Dr. King... as to the press' coverage of the event." Estate of Martin Luther King,
Jr., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1352-53. However, in earlier litigation of the issue in New York, Dr.
King said that he did not consent in any way to the NEW YORK POST's printing of the speech's
complete text in its issue dated September 1, 1963. King, 224 F. Supp. at 104.
391. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1216.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 143-152.
393. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1216.
394. See supra text accompanying notes 182.185.
395. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1217.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.

910

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:857

purposes. Such a limitation would have only marginally reduced the
public's exposure to the speech, 397 while preserving his common law
copyright in the speech.
In addition, the tangible-intangible
distinction has no relevance to the issue of publication in this
situation. Dissemination to the public of a copy of the text of the
speech would constitute a general publication, whereas distribution
only to the press for reporting would not.
Fourth, Dr. King may have authorized the SCLC to reprint the
speech's text in its entirety in the organization's newsletter prior to
compliance with the statutory formalities. 398 Such an act would have
constituted a general, not limited, publication because the distribution
would not have been to a select group for a limited purpose. Although
the SCLC could be considered a select group, its reprinting of the
speech was not for the purpose of news coverage but for the purpose of
exhibiting or displaying the speech "in such a manner as to permit
unrestricted copying by the general public." 399 After all, the SCLC's
mission was to promote the type of values that the speech embodied,
40 0
and distributing the speech served that purpose.
A closing comment on the application of the 1909 Act's dual
policies to Dr. King's "performance plus" is warranted. Perhaps no
other work in the history of U.S. copyright law is more important to
the free dissemination of ideas than the "I Have a Dream" speech. Its
message of hope and equality was a particularly influential aspect of
the civil rights movement that brought about the end to legalized
segregation in the South 4° 1 and continues to resonate in the American
conscience. 40 2 On the other hand, granting Dr. King the economic
reward of a limited monopoly would have provided him little, if any,
additional incentive to create the "I Have a Dream" speech. Few
would dispute that his reason for giving the speech was not economic
motivation but rather his hopeful vision of an America which "will rise
397. For example, about 200,000 people witnessed the "I Have a Dream" speech in person,
but millions more viewed or read it through its media coverage. See supra text accompanying
notes 2-3.
398. Estate ofMartin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1214.
399. Id. at 1215.
400. See SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference), Who We Are, at
http://sclcnational.org/page.aspx?s=3021.0.0.2607 (last visited Aug. 27, 2004) (stating that the
SCLC has a "long history of struggle for basic human rights" and that it has "roots in the larger
history of liberation struggles by Black people and all oppressed peoples the world over").
401. Cf. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc., 194 F.3d at 1213 (noting that the speech
"became symbolic of the civil rights movement").
402. The continued prominence of the speech is manifested, for example, by the recent press
coverage of the speech on Martin Luther King Days and anniversaries of Dr. King's performance.
E.g., Courtland Milloy, King Day's Parade Route Is Out of Step, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 19,
2004, at B01; Gary Dorsey, The American 'Dream,' THE BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 28, 2003, at IC.
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up and live out the true meaning of its creed: 'We hold these truths to
be self-evident: that all men are created equal.' "403 Nonetheless, the
1909 Act gave owners the ability to choose copyright protection or to
donate the work to the public domain. Dr. King chose copyright
protection, and the practical considerations of the performance and
limited publication exceptions should have prevented federal law from
stripping him of that protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note proposes a solution to an unsettled legal problem
that is almost a century old.
It provides a new definition of
publication under the 1909 Act: subject to the exceptions of limited
publication, performance, and the distribution of a phonorecord
embodying a musical composition, publication is the exploitation of a
work authorized by the author and/or owner of the work. This
definition, which is consistent with the 1909 Act as written, has three
primary strengths. First, it adheres to the congressional balance
between the dual policies of the 1909 Act.
The definitions of
publication that preclude the exploitation of intangible embodiments
of a work from constituting publication greatly favor the principle of
reward to authors over the policy of free dissemination of ideas. This
result occurs under those definitions because they allow for an author
to gain an extended copyright term, while simultaneously postponing
the public's unfettered access to the work. This Note's definition
avoids this problem by treating tangible and intangible exploitations
of a work the same way.
Second, this Note's definition avoids the problem of rewarding
those who did not comply with the 1909 Act's statutory formalities
while penalizing those who did. Under the definitions that endorse
the tangible-intangible distinction, those who exploited only intangible
embodiments of a work and did not comply with the 1909 Act's
formalities obtained an extended copyright term. Thus, adherence to
the tangible-intangible distinction created an incentive for authors
and/or owners to delay, or avoid altogether, compliance with the 1909
Act's formalities in order to lengthen the term of the limited monopoly.
On the other hand, those who complied immediately with the
formalities of the 1909 Act would have essentially been punished by
receiving a copyright lasting only the statutorily determined period,
instead of the extended period that could have been achieved through
403. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), available at,
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/Ihaveadream.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2004) (full
audio and text version).
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delayed compliance. This Note's definition avoids this problem by
eliminating the incentive to delay compliance with the 1909 Act's
formalities.
Third, this Note's definition prevents the considerable judicial
overreaching that can occur through reliance on the tangibleintangible distinction. The Constitution gives Congress, not the
courts, the power to determine the duration of a copyright term. 40 4
Under the 1909 Act as originally enacted, Congress provided a
copyright lasting a maximum of fifty-six years. However, courts that
adhere to the tangible-intangible distinction can greatly lengthen the
copyright term.
Where an owner only disseminates intangible
embodiments of a work, for instance, by broadcasting a song on the
radio, a court could grant a copyright term of one hundred-and-thirtyseven years. 40 5 This Note's definition prevents this encroachment on
Congress's constitutionally authorized power.
On the other hand, critics of this Note's definition may argue
that it leads to harsh results for authors in some instances by slightly
expanding the acts of exploitation that constitute publication and,
therefore, that may place a work in the public domain. This Note's
definition leads to such an expansion in two ways. First, it rejects the
tangible-intangible distinction, espoused by some, but not all, as a
requirement for a work's publication. 406 The result is that, for
example, broadcasting a previously made studio recording of a song on
the radio or a previously made set recording of a film on television can
constitute publication. 407 Second, it limits the performance exception
to situations where either a live performance is involved or situations
in which practical considerations warrant a broader interpretation of
the term "performance." 408 Thus, the live performance of a play or a
song constitutes a non-publishing performance, 40 9 but the playing of a
previously made phonorecord on the radio should be considered a
publication, not simply a performance. 410

404. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8., cl.1, 8 ("The Congress shall have Power") (emphasis added); cf.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003) (concluding that the Supreme Court "defer[s]
substantially to Congress" on questions of the constitutionality of statutes providing the duration
of copyright terms).
405. See supratext accompanying notes 107-111, 192.
406. See supranote 85.
407. See supratext accompanying note 253-254.
408. See supratext accompanying notes 193-195.
409. See Ferris v. Froham, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912) (holding that the live performance of a
play does not constitute publication).
410. See King Records, Inc. v. Daily, No. 3:00-0300, slip op. at 17 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2003)
(holding that radio play constitutes publication).
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Such a critique, however, is misguided. No one has proposed
equating publication with obtaining a valid federal copyright. Yet,
under the 1909 Act, harshness necessarily results when using any
other definition. 411
Compared to definitions that adhere to the
tangible-intangible distinction and a broad interpretation of the
performance exception, this Note's definition is less arbitrary in the
way that it grants a copyright and injects a work into the public
domain. 4 12 It does so by generally deeming a publication any
exploitation of a work that provides incentive for the author and/or
owner to create. Moreover, this Note's definition accommodates the
practical considerations, such as live performance and limited
distribution to friends and even to the press, where publication would
be especially harsh. In addition, unlike competing definitions, this
Note's definition generally prevents the unauthorized extension of
monopoly privileges, which ameliorates the harshness of injection into
the public domain.
Although forfeiture of an author's work to the public domain
can be a significant loss to the author, the 1909 Act provides for
precisely this result under certain circumstances. This consequence
encouraged compliance with the statutory scheme 413 and promotes the
1909 Act's policy of providing copyright protection "primarily for the
benefit of the public." 4 14 Courts that apply the 1909 Act should not
forget that the central purpose of the 1909 Act, and U.S. copyright law
in general, is to promote ideas that benefit the public-ideas such as
those embodied in Dr. King's "I Have a Dream" speech.
W. Russell Taber*

411. For example, publication by distribution of sheet music divests an author of his
ownership rights, but the notion that the distribution of sheet music constitutes publication is
uncontroversial. See supra note 198.
412. Cf. GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 199, at 385 ("Despite how crucial it was to have a
clear understanding of the concept of 'publication' under the 1909 Act, a number of rather
arbitrary distinctions emerged in giving content to that term.").
413. See La Cienega v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 1995), superceded by 17 U.S.C. §
303(b) (2004) (discussing compliance with the 1909 Act's statutory formalities).
414. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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